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ABSTRACT
The breadth and depth of the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) are becoming
more substantial. RFID is a technology useful for identifying unique items through radio
waves. We design algorithms on RFID-based systems for the Grouping Proof and Cardinality
Estimation problems.
A grouping-proof protocol is evidence that a reader simultaneously scanned the RFID
tags in a group. In many practical scenarios, grouping-proofs greatly expand the potential
of RFID-based systems such as supply chain applications, simultaneous scanning of mul-
tiple forms of IDs in banks or airports, and government paperwork. The design of RFID
grouping-proofs that provide optimal security, privacy, and efficiency is largely an open area,
with challenging problems including robust privacy mechanisms, addressing completeness
and incompleteness (missing tags), and allowing dynamic groups definitions. In this work
we present three variations of grouping-proof protocols that implement our mechanisms to
overcome these challenges.
Cardinality estimation is for the reader to determine the number of tags in its commu-
nication range. Speed and accuracy are important goals. Many practical applications need
an accurate and anonymous estimation of the number of tagged objects. Examples include
intelligent transportation and stadium management. We provide an optimal estimation al-
gorithm template for cardinality estimation that works for a {0, 1, e} channel, which extends




In this time of ubiquitous computing and the evolution of the Internet of Things (IoT),
the deployment and development of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is becoming
more extensive. RFID is a method of identifying unique items using radio waves. An RFID
system typically consists of three different types of entities: tags, readers and a verifier. The
tags are embedded in, or attached to, objects to be identified. The most common tags are
passive tags. Passive tags use radio frequency (RF) energy induced by electromagnetic waves
emitted by the reader. A typical communication sequence is: the reader emits a continuous
RF wave, a tag in the RF field of the reader receives energy from the field and responds
[17, 40, 52, 67, 86, 90, 111, 125]. RFID is an open wireless communication technology,
inexpensive and very energy efficient, particularly for passive RFID tags. Important features
of RFID technology are that it allows to write and read data contactless and without a line
of sight.
RFIDs are important to modern society. This dissertation studies algorithms on RFID-
based systems: Grouping Proof and Cardinality Estimation.
Grouping Proof: A grouping-proof protocol is evidence that a reader simultaneously
scanned the RFID tags in a group [16, 53, 86, 87, 93, 98, 99, 106].
There are many practical scenarios where grouping-proofs can greatly expand the po-
tential of RFID-based systems, such as drugs to be shipped, or dispensed, with information
leaflets (safety regulation); inventory of equipment in before and out after a surgery; si-
multaneous scanning of multiple forms of IDs in banks or airports; government paperwork;
evidence in court etc. We are proposing grouping-proof protocols that improve on security,
privacy, and efficiency over existing schemes. For example, the protocol must resist replay
attacks, where an adversary who eavesdrops on the communications between reader and
tag and obtains exchanged messages should not be able to obtain any tag/reader secrets by
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resending earlier messages. RFID tags are critically constrained in memory, communication,
and computation. We want a protocol to be compatible with the technical capabilities of
an RFID. We also want a protocol to be scalable. Scalability problems in RFID grouping-
proofs, such as collision from responses of multiple tags after a reader request or due to an
increasing number of tags in the system, will gradually degrade its performance. Researchers
have often overlooked scalability when designing protocols. We work through these protocol
ideas in designing and proposing our own approaches.
The design of RFID grouping-proofs that provide optimal security, privacy, and efficiency
is largely an open area, with challenging problems including robust privacy mechanisms,
addressing completeness and incompleteness (missing tags), and allowing dynamic groups
definitions.
Cardinality Estimation: In cardinality estimation, the reader determines the number of
tags in its communication range. Speed and accuracy are crucial [4, 20, 34, 42, 48, 53, 68,
97, 121, 129, 133]. It has many practical applications. For example, in warehouse manage-
ment (with retailers like Walmart), where thousands of products (such as mobile phones,
iPods, tablets, and other peripherals) are stored and tracked in a small space. Accurately
estimating the number of tagged objects for recurrent inventory reports, instead of laborious
and unreliable manual counting, is important. In some privacy sensitive scenarios, such as
counting the number of visitors to an event where attendees have RFID tickets/cards/bands,
the exposure of identification information on tags, such as credit card information, can put
privacy at risk. Therefore, a scheme that can use the non-identifiable information from tags
to compute the cardinality is highly desired. In this part of the study we consider a slotted
(synchronous) communication channel (through which tags communicate with the reader)
that accepts binary inputs from set {0, 1} and outputs a symbol {0, 1, e}, which indicates at
a given slot there are zero, one, or more than one writes by tags to the channel.
We provide an algorithm for tag population that works for a {0, 1, e} channel. This first
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part of our work is an extension of the work of Hasan et al. [48] who proposed the GERT
(Gaussian Estimator of RFID Tags) algorithm for estimating tag population in {0, e} (a
channel that outputs 0 when no tags write and an e if it writes) and applied the fe − f0
estimator. Following the same analytical approach, we extend the work to a {0, 1, e} channel.
We too used the fe − f0 estimator; however, it has different meaning compared to that
in the {0, e} channel. In the second part of our work on tag population estimation, we
developed a framework for using simulated data to generate an optimal estimation algorithm.
As a product of this work we also develop methods for initial estimates, extending a well
known method due to Willard [119] to more accurate Willard, Willard+, and Willard∗
algorithms.
1.1 RFID and Its Importance
The applications of RFID-based systems are many and varied in numerous industries,
including ones in high-risk environments, health and safety. The fundamental capability of
RFID systems is to track tagged items which avoids the need of manual workforce as the
data is generated automatically. It wirelessly identifies people and objects by sensing the
surroundings. More and more businesses are using this technology including in the next
generation of business intelligence [2, 5, 30, 31, 32, 41, 43, 49, 52, 54, 61, 66, 83, 86, 92, 96,
111, 113, 114, 116, 117, 123, 126].
The breadth of applications includes the healthcare industry [2, 30, 31, 43, 113], where
RFIDs are used to track inventory, identify patients, manage personnel, monitor the user’s
health and activate remote assistance.
Food supply chain (FSC) - farm to fork [32, 83, 92, 116, 123] uses tags in food logistics
that aim to enable new types of efficient and responsive networks with flexible tracking,
tracing, and decision support based on information.
The retail industry itself employs smart shopping carts [49, 61] that use low energy
Bluetooth to track and localize items and display promotions and sales for the customer.
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The data generated can also be used for pricing, product placement, and reducing waiting
times in checkout (Amazon Go).
The transportation sector uses tags for traffic management [5, 41, 96, 114]. Examples
are an advanced plate recognition system for car parking, traffic congestion control, vehicle
fusion positioning, tracking items on conveyor belt, and traffic light control.
The increasing popularity and ubiquity of RFID technology, however, comes with serious
concerns for security and privacy. Some example security concerns are the following. Imper-
sonating the reader or a tag, an attacker may be able to obtain a reader’s and a tag’s secret
values. If an attacker blocks the exchanged message(s) or when messages are lost during
transmission (system crash or communication error), then the tags can be desynchronized
from a reader. Privacy concerns include the following. An attacker may be able to break
the anonymity of the reader and tags in the grouping-proof (called “information leakage”).
If an attacker observes that a tag’s responses are static or linked, then it can track the tag’s
location over time (called “malicious traceability”).
Other factors affecting the efficiency and the performance of an RFID system are [36,
37, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108]: an estimate for tag population, number of tags read by
the reader in case of collision, the read range of the tag around the reader’s surroundings,
an authentication mechanism of the entities involved in the communication, a searching
mechanism for tags, etc. Continued improvement in circuit design aims to improve protocols,
read range, reliability, etc. RFID costs decreased in the past decade which leads to escalating
of their applications.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents background and
prior work in the literature. Background contains general technical details for the compo-
nents of a common RFID system. Prior work in the literature includes discussion on prior
work on grouping-proofs and prior work on cardinality estimation. Chapter 3 describes the
overview of RFID grouping-proof protocols. It provides comprehensive grouping-proof char-
acteristics - definition, model, design requirements and how it all applies while designing
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a protocol. We have formally defined an adversary model and RFID privacy model, un-
der which we evaluate our presented grouping-proofs protocols in the following chapters.
Chapter 4 describes the Serial-Dependency Grouping Proof Protocol (SDGPP). Chapter 5
describes the Parallel-Dependency Grouping Proof Protocol (PDGPP). Chapter 6 describes
the Dynamic Grouping Proof Protocol (DGPP). Chapter 7 describes the cardinality esti-
mation approaches for tag population. We then conclude with a summary of results in this
dissertation and propose possible future work.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR WORK
2.1 Background
Wireless channels connect objects and enable communication among those objects and
also with the Internet. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is one of the resource-
constrained technologies (such as IEEE 802.15.4, Bluetooth, Bluetooth Low Energy, IEEE
802.11 Low Power, PLC, NFC) that permit data transfer with low energy consumption [111].
Advances in RFID technology allow information to be stored (tags can hold data) and then
be read contactless and without a line of sight. In an RFID system tags are classified as
active, semi-passive, or passive [40]. We intentionally omit the technical description of active
and semi-passive tags. Both types of tags are too expensive to place on low-cost items, and
our work does not consider them.
A Passive tag: This type of tags has no internal power source. It harvests energy from the
nearby readers, then that energy energizes the chip to send an answer back to the reader’s
request. Thus, its computation and communication capabilities are very limited. For the
EPC Gen2 protocol, a global standard in ISO UHF 1, the communication distance is at most
10m, data rate is 0-60 Kb/s, the frequency range is 860-960MHz, and up to 3000 gates are
available for security implementation [40, 86, 87, 125]. Also, this standard provides a tag
with up to four inventory flags, which allow four readers in parallel to communicate with a
single tag at any given time.
Common RFID protocols include EPC Gen1 and EPC Gen2 2. Our work considers the
EPC Gen2 features. EPC Gen1 has no global standard. EPC Gen2 has a requirement of
a minimum 96-bits for EPC identifier. EPC Gen2 also provides an optional unlimited user
tag memory. The additional memory could store time stamps from transactions, codes, and
1ISO 18000-6C Ultra High Frequency
2EPC - Electronic Product Code
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sensing data. [33, 86].
RFID tags do not have clocks. However, the activity time of a tag during a single session is
limited. In EPC Gen2 when tags are energized by a reader and engaged in a communication,
they are capable of receiving and acting on reader commands within a period not exceeding
the maximum settling-time interval in the protocol. Both reader and tags need to meet all
timing requirements according the technical documentation for the protocol.
The Reader: This is a relatively powerful device. That provides power to the tags in
order to communicate with them. For EPC Gen2, the maximum theoretical reading speed
is 1000 tags/second. Experimental results [38, 106] show a minimum tag read rate of 150
tags/second to a maximum read rate of 450/second. Both simulations were conducted in
virtual environments and hence some slight performance variation should be anticipated in
real-world implementations. In writing operations, readers can write to five tags per second.
A reader may have up to 1000m range [21, 40, 86, 87, 125].
A reader manages tag populations using three operations - select, inventory, and access,
described briefly below [40].
• Select - A reader selects a tag population for subsequent inventory authentication.
Select comprises the Select and Challenge commands.
• Inventory - The process by which a reader identifies tags. Inventory comprises multiple
commands.
• Access - The process by which a reader transacts with (reads, writes, authenticates, or
otherwise engages with) an individual tag. Access comprises multiple commands.
Each of the reader operations refesr to multiple commands on a tag side - ready, arbitrate,
reply, acknowledge, open, secured, killed [40].
The verifier: This is a powerful back-end server. That acts as a trusted entity that
maintains a database, containing the information needed to identify tags.
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2.1.1 Other Definitions Related to RFID Systems
We have added a list for some additional technical definitions that may be helpful
throughout the content of the research presented [40, 86].
Electronic Product Code (EPC) - Complements the bar codes. The EPC has digits to
identify the manufacturer, product category and individual item.
Backscatter modulation - A method of communication between passive tags and readers;
in this process a tag responds to a reader signal or field by modulating and reradiating the
response signal at the same carrier frequency. The reflected signal is modulated to transmit
data.
Reader-Talks-First - A reader initiates communication with tags in its read field. The
reader sends energy to the tags but the tags sit idle until the reader requests them to respond.
The reader is able to find tags by specifications designated in the EPC protocol.
Singulation - When an RFID reader identifies a tag with specific identity from a number
of tags in its field. There are different methods of singulation, but the most common is “tree
walking” (for example, asking all tags with an identity that starts with 0 or 1 to respond;
if more than one responds, then the reader may ask for all tags with an identity that starts
with 01 to respond, and so on).
2.1.2 The Communication Channel
Tags communicate with the reader through a wireless channel, signaling their presence
by writing to the channel. In this level of abstraction a tag is said to write (a symbol ′1′) or
not write (a symbol ′0′) on the channel. Thus the channel accepts symbols from {0, 1}. The
channel produces one output symbol which is typically read by the reader. Communication
through the channel is synchronized or “slotted”. That is, all tags and reader access the
channel in lock step. During a slot, a subset S of tags can write to the channel. This is
indicated as tags of S writing a ′1′ to the channel and the tags of S writing a ′0′ to the
channel.
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The {0, e} channel is usually represented in the literature to as the {0, 1} channel. Our
tag estimation scheme as well as others, uses a frame (collection of slots) to examine the
population. Typically, tags write a ′1′ or a ′0′ into each slot of the frame and the channel
outputs a symbol from {0, 1, ..., k− 1, e} for each slot, indicating the number of tags writing
to the slot. For any symbol s ∈ {0, 1, ..., k − 1, e}, we denote by fs the number of slots
containing symbol ′s′. We will use fs for tag population estimation. In our work we are also
introducing the concept of high resolution channel. A channel of resolution k ≥ 1 is one that
accepts input symbols from {0, 1} and outputs a symbol from {0, 1, ..., k − 1, e}
2.2 Prior Work on Grouping-Proof
Juels [55] introduced the problem of giving evidence that two tags have been simul-
taneously scanned, called a yoking proof. A grouping proof generalizes this to a larger
number of tags. Bolotnyy and Robins [11] introduced the idea of anonymous grouping-
proofs. Early work on anonymous grouping-proof protocols includes Burmester et al. [15],
Peris-Lopez et al. [85], Chien and Liu [27], and others [39, 65, 73, 88, 110]. Grouping-
proof protocols from the past few years reveal a variety of approaches to address different
goals, such as achieving high efficiency (scalability) and improving on privacy and security
[1, 16, 26, 51, 79, 93, 94, 98, 99, 101, 106, 134, 136]. Below we review some recent and
interesting papers in grouping-proof research, also used for comparison to our own work.
Zhang et al. [134] introduced a parallel grouping-proof protocol with an anti-collision
algorithm based on adaptive pruning query tree (A4PQT) to identify the response message
of tags. The protocol involves updating state variables, which allows the entity involved in
the grouping-proof protocol to have values that stay run specific.
The protocol begins with a reader’s request to get pre-authorized from the verifier. Then
the reader executes two rounds in parallel then one round with serial communication, sending
a message to each individual tag in the group to update its pseudonym and secret values for
its state. The protocol does not have integrity checks and does not verify that tags updated
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at the end of the protocol, which make it vulnerable to impersonation, desynchronization,
denial of proof, replay, and message integrity attacks.
Rostampour et al. [93] introduced a one-round grouping-proof protocol. The reader
broadcasts the request message to all tags once and the tags respond to the reader. The
protocol lacks dependency among tag communications, which requires a second round in a
grouping-proof protocol. The protocol is suitable for passive tags, as it requires only PRNG
and XOR operations. The protocol does not provide an acceptable security level and is
vulnerable to replay, message integrity, and denial of proof attacks.
The protocol provides a formal security analysis using BAN (Burrows, Abadi, Needham)
logic for analyzing its robustness. A comparison table weighs the performance in terms of
various aspects such as scalability, gate equivalent, computation cost of a tag, exchanged
messages between the reader and the tags, and the storage of each tag. However, we find
some comparisons not accurately evaluated in the security comparison table. Also, the
protocol compares to older grouping proof protocols rather than current ones.
Shi et al. [98] introduced a parallel grouping-proof protocol based on a DHCP (Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol) mechanism. The protocol involves multiple readers and multi-
ple tag groups. During the grouping proof, the verifier chooses one reader and one tag group
by means of a DHCP mechanism. DHCP mechanism implies selecting entities in a protocol
according to their arrival time after a query is sent.
The protocol is designed for two modes: active mode and passive mode. Under active
mode, the verifier knows the tag group for which it wants to search, as opposed to under the
passive mode where the verifier does not know the tag group for which it wants to search. The
protocol includes four phases: authorize a reader, choose a tag group, generate grouping-
proof evidence, and verify the grouping-proof evidence. The protocol is not suitable for
passive tags, because the tags compute hash functions. The protocol is vulnerable to denial
of proof and message integrity attacks.
Hsi et al. [51] introduced a protocol for scalable grouping-proofs. Scalability problems
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in a grouping-proof protocol arise due to:
- messages relayed from one tag to another - when tag numbers increase, system perfor-
mance gradually reduces;
- collision - after a reader queries tags, multiple tags respond simultaneously;
- exhaustive search - for protecting the privacy of tags, protocols adopt anonymity and
make the verifier exhaustively search a tag database for the actual identity of a tag.
Hsi et al.’s protocol uses a run-specific pseudo-identity of tags in the group to protect
each tag’s privacy and improve on system performance. Tags order their responses based on
the location of their pseudo-identity in a randomly permuted sequence of those identities.
This also helps avoid tracking internal members of the group.
Burmester and Munilla [16] introduced a well designed protocol under very clear and
strong grouping-proof design criteria. The reader uses an “erasure code” to enable identifying
missing tag identities from a generated grouping proof if the proof is incomplete.
Abughazalah et al. [1] introduced a one-round grouping-proof protocol with no depen-
dency among tag computations. The reader broadcasts a message to all tags, then the tags
prepare the responses and reply to the reader. The protocol is not suitable for passive tags,
because the tags compute hash functions. The protocol does not provide an acceptable se-
curity level and is vulnerable to impersonation, desynchronization, denial of proof, replay,
and message integrity attacks.
Many of the current approaches to grouping proofs do not comply with the EPC standard
for passive RFID tags and assume complex encryption schemes and cryptographic techniques.
Zhou et al. [136] introduced a protocol that uses elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC). The
practical implementation of ECC is still an open research problem [100], as it is a costly
technique in term of gates to implement security features in passive EPC tags. The paper
provides improvements in key distribution.
Yuan and Liu [128] introduced a protocol within the universally composable (UC) frame-
work. Universal composability [18, 19] specifies a particular approach to security formal-
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ization, which guarantees that a UC-based security proof for a protocol remains valid if it
is composed with other protocols (modularity) or if it is executed in arbitrary concurrent
settings. RFID systems can be components of a more elaborate application, and as a result
protocols are secure under composability with arbitrary applications. The main attribute of
the UC framework is that UC security of a composite system can be obtained from the UC
security of its components without the need of further integrated evaluation of its robustness
[86].
In Yuan and Liu’s protocol, messages exchanged during a session have no time limitation
and the protocol implements no updating mechanism. The protocol is very well designed
under the assumption of UC framework. However, it has several issues related to inefficiency.
2.2.1 RFID Privacy Models
Coisel and Martin [28] introduced an overview of existing RFID privacy models. The
paper reviews eight RFID privacy models and analyzes their advantages and disadvantages,
examining them across a selection of RFID authentication protocols. The paper concludes
the following: as protocols ensure different privacy levels, no model is able to accurately
distinguish them. They group the models according to features (for example - tag corruption
ability). A classification like this helps to determine the most suitable model to be applied
for a privacy analysis of an RFID protocol. However, some combinations of features may
not match any model which makes it difficult to distinguish protocols that evidently ensure
different privacy levels. The paper provides an overall comparison view of the eight models’
relations and privacy properties. It shows that no model globally outclasses the other ones.
The paper stated that the most comprehensive RFID privacy model published so far is
the Vaudenay model [115]. Vaudenay introduced an important point in his model, where
privacy is considered as being ensured as long as an adversary cannot detect that a given tag
is simulated without the knowledge of its secret. After then, researchers have proposed many
models using different approaches, introducing new features, or pointing out weaknesses in
12
the existing models. Unfortunately, even though the Vaudenay model is shown to be the
most comprehensive RFID privacy model, the model is unable to distinguish some currently
proposed protocols that have different privacy levels and so cannot provide a full privacy
assessment.
Avoine et al. [8] introduced an RFID untraceability model. The model aims to assist
while designing proofs or describing attacks. It is a modular model where adversary actions
(oracles), capabilities (selectors and restrictions), and goals (experiment) follow a straight
forward approach. The model design enhances the ability to formalize new adversarial
assumptions and future evolutions of the technology. The paper’s untraceability model
provides a comprehensive privacy assessment and evaluation of protocols. We have used the
model to assess our protocols (see Chapters 4 - 6). Chapter 3 presents details about the
model.
2.3 Prior Work on Cardinality Estimation
Hasan et al. [48] introduced an estimator for the {0, e} (or {0, 1}) channel. This estimator
is fe − f0 (or f1 − f0 in this setting). Their GERT (Gaussian Estimator of RFID Tags)
algorithmic model uses slotted Aloha. The method makes the estimator distribution in a
frame Gaussian by using an adequately large frame size. Also, it analytically bounds the
approximation error (assuming a Gaussian distribution) in terms of the error requirement
of the tag estimate problem. We use the method of Hasan et al. to analyze the fe − f0
estimator for the {0, 1, e} channel.
Liu et al.’s [68] SEM (simultaneous estimation for multi-category RFID systems) exploits
the Manchester-coding mechanism, where it decodes the combined signals (simultaneously
obtaining the reply status of tags from each category). An output is multiple bit vectors,
decoded from just one physical slotted frame. To ensure the predefined accuracy, SEM
calculates the variance of the estimate in one round, as well as the variance of the average
estimate in multiple rounds.
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Shahzad et al.’s [97] ART (Average Run-Based Tag) uses the average run length of non-
empty slots in a {0, e} channel. The first trial in ART is to obtain a rough estimate. The
quality of this rough estimate is low since, since ART uses only a single trial. In each following
trial, each tag participates independently with a certain probability of writing (balls-and-
bins trials). ART then observes which slots in each trial are nonempty and it calculates
the average run length of nonempty slots (the average length of sequences of consecutive
nonempty slots) and uses such information to generate a final estimate (the more nonempty
slots the larger the average run length is).
Zhang et al. [129] introduced joint cardinality estimation among tags. The paper’s
motivation comes from practical scenarios with a need to monitor tagged objects of many
different types. The paper extends the traditional RFID estimation problem to a problem for
estimating the category-level information over multiple tag sets at different locations and/or
different times.
Yu et al. [53] introduced a method for tag estimation and counting for static and dynamic
groups. The paper defined the static case in which tag population remains constant during
the estimation process, as opposed to the dynamic case where tag population may vary during
the estimation process. The paper proposes a generic framework of stable and accurate tag
population estimation schemes based on Kalman filtering.
Gong et al. [72] showed that ART [97] and SRC [133] work only for certain distributions
of the number of tags (such as uniform or normal). This does not work in practice. The
Gong et al. work [72] introduces a new estimator called RPC (rigorous practical cardinality)
and shows that it works well. However, it requires passive tags to use hashed IDs which
impose an overhead on the system.
Zhou et al. [133] demonstrated that the key design aspect for any RFID counting function
to achieve near-optimal performance is a conceptual separation of a protocol into two phases.
The first phase uses a small overhead to obtain a rough estimate, and the second phase uses
the rough estimate to achieve an accuracy target.
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Based on this they establish lower bounds of:
• [Phase 1:] Ω(log log T ) slots to obtain an initial estimate with constant relative error;
this is similar to the Willard Algorithm approach [119];
• [Phase 2:] Ω(1/α2 log (1/α)) slots to obtain a final estimate with α error probability.
They also compared several estimators including EZB, (enhanced) FNEB [47], LOF [47],
ZOE [131], A3 [45], etc. They also presented their own approach SRC (Simple RFID Count-
ing Protocol), that applied the two-phase method.
Wu et al. [121] introduced a method for tag estimation using a capture-aware Bayesian
estimate algorithm in which tag distance from the reader is used to refine the tag estimate.
Some other important estimation functions are listed below.
• LoF - uses the length of continues non-empty slots [89]
• FNEB - uses indices of the first non-empty slot for multiple rounds [47]
• EZB - number of empty slots in the frame for estimation [60]
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CHAPTER 3
OVERVIEW OF GROUPING PROOF PROTOCOL CONCEPTS
3.1 Introduction
A grouping-proof is evidence that a reader simultaneously scanned the RFID tags in a
group [1, 15, 16, 26, 51, 55, 79, 101, 106, 109, 136]. All communication is within RFID
wireless channels. A verifier must be able to use the proof to document the presence of
objects in the group. The unique aspects of RFID applications, efficiency, security, privacy,
and scalability are key considerations when designing a grouping-proof protocol. In recent
research for RFID grouping-proofs, many protocols make assumptions that are not compati-
ble with the technical capabilities for RFID. RFID tags are critically constrained in memory,
communication, and computation. Recall from Chapter 2, Section 2 under the EPC Class
1 Generation 2 (C1G2) standard, passive tags can accommodate fewer than 3K gates to
implement security features [40]. Some grouping-proof protocols, however, use hashing or
encryption. Hash functions (for example, [16]) require 8K to 10K gates. Elliptic-curve cryp-
tography (ECC), while less costly than alternatives such as AES and RSA, still requires 8K
to 15K equivalent gates [100, 101].
In general, grouping proofs fall into two categories - serial and parallel grouping proofs.
• In serial grouping-proofs, the reader sends messages to the tags one tag at a time. The
reader sends a message to a tag, the tag computes, the tag responds, then the reader
moves on to the next tag. The reader constructs dependency among tags in a proof by
having each tag incorporate a message sent by previous tag(s) into its own computation.
The reader is the one forwarding all the messages from one tag to another.
• In parallel grouping-proofs, the reader broadcasts messages to all tags. All tags that
receive the message compute in parallel, but communicate back to the reader one at a
time.
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Other categorizations are also common among RFID grouping-proof research.
• Offline and online grouping-proofs - In an RFID system, the verifier can be online or
offline with respect to its communication to the reader. In the offline mode, the reader
does not stay continuously connected to the verifier, and the reader will send its proof
to the verifier when they next connect, which may be some time after it builds the
proof. In contrast, in the online mode, the reader has a continuous connectivity with
the verifier. In online mode, the reader does not have to construct a proof, as it can
send information from each tag to the verifier as the information arrives. Offline mode
is considered to be the challenging case.
• Static and dynamic groups - Static grouping-proofs establish only the presence of pre-
defined groups of tags [86]. Dynamic grouping-proofs can handle any subsets of a
larger group of authorized tags. One application of the dynamic grouping proofs is
when the subgroups form a partition of a large group [63]. The demand to address
such a need comes from the unreliable radio interference, as when the number of the
tags of a group is larger, the probability of the interrogation failure grows. Partitioning
into smaller subgroups is an advantage for the protocol in two ways: the interrogation
process can abort early if there is an error, and in a second iteration the reader will
need to interrogate only the subgroups for which no proof was generated.
• Reading order-dependent and reading order-independent - In a reading order-dependent
protocol, the reader must interrogate tags in predetermined order. Reading order-
independent protocols can operate regardless of the order of interrogating tags or re-
ceiving their responses.
Parallel grouping-proofs are primarily reading order-independent, though, there are some
protocols [51, 63] that are reading order-dependent. Serial grouping-proofs are primarily
reading order-dependent but can be reading order-independent. An example reading order-
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dependent serial grouping-proof [65] shows the following disadvantages - inefficiency, higher
interrogation failure rates, and inability to provide acceptable privacy.
RFID communication is a sequential process and interrogation simultaneity can only be
captured by an “exposure-time” window: events are considered as happening simultaneously
if they take place within this window defined by the verifier [16, 87]. A grouping proof should
prove simultaneity, a mechanism to do it is to guarantee causality. To guarantee causality, a
proof must assure that a message input to a tag should be derived from computations that
can only be carried out by other tag(s) participating in the proof.
3.2 Background Concepts of a Grouping Proof Protocol
Chapter 2 gives background on RFID systems. Recall that the protocol involves three
types of entities: tags, a reader, and a verifier. Our work considers passive tags operating
under the EPC Gen2 version 2 specification [21, 40]. The reader manages tag groups using
three basic operations: select, inventory and access. In access, an authorized reader can
put a tag into an open state such that the tag will not respond to any other reader when a
protocol is executed. Though a tag does not have a clock, it can be programmed to respond
to the reader for a bounded time period.
In each of our protocols the reader and tags use a pseudo-random number generator
(PRNG). The verifier also uses a PRNG to verify the reader and tag computations (mes-
sages). Mandal et al. [74] and Martin et al. [76] present PRNGs suitable for EPC Gen2
version 2.
We assume that the wireless communication channel between a reader and a tag is not
secure, while the channel between the reader and the verifier is secure. Entities do not
trust readers and tags, but the verifier can authenticate readers, and readers and tags can
authenticate each other using shared information loaded during initialization.
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3.2.1 General Design Requirements for Grouping-Proof Protocols
Design requirements for our grouping-proof protocols include the following.
1. Establish “simultaneous” presence of tags in a group, meaning that the reader must
communicate with all tags within a limited time window [88].
2. Construct a proof even if some tags are missing such that the proof identifies the tags
that are present and omits the missing tags.
3. Detect tags that do not belong to the group and omit them from the grouping proof.
4. Keep reader and tags synchronized across multiple runs [73].
5. Prevent a second reader from interfering with a grouping proof once it has started [65].
6. Verify the integrity of messages exchanged between reader and a tag and between
reader and verifier to prevent the generation of invalid proofs [106].
7. Ensure tag privacy - prevent an adversary from using information communicated during
a run to track a tag in the future or identify past presence of a tag using information
from previous runs of the protocol.
3.2.2 Grouping-Proof Problem Definition
The verifier securely loads information onto readers and tags during an initialization
phase, but it is not connected to either reader or tags during the construction of the grouping-
proof by a reader. (Hence, the reader constructs the grouping-proof offline.) The trigger for
a reader to begin a grouping-proof protocol can be a pre-loaded time (such as in a warehouse
application) or a user can start the proof process (such as in a supply-chain application).
The reader is to determine which tags of a group of tags are simultaneously present within
its range, and the reader is to construct a grouping-proof that it sends to the verifier. The
verifier receives the grouping-proof from a reader at some time after the reader constructs
this proof, and the verifier checks this proof for validity.
19
3.2.3 Adversary Model
We assume that the adversary has the ability to completely control the communication
channel between the reader and tags. That is, the adversary can eavesdrop, modify, block
(delete), delay, and replay any messages during transmission. The adversary can send its
own messages to the reader (spoofing a tag) and to tags (spoofing the reader). The adversary
can attempt to spoil a grouping proof in various ways, including generating proofs that an
absent tag is present or vice versa and extracting information to allow it to track specific
tags. At times, we will assume that the adversary has the ability to corrupt some tags, that
is, extract the secrets and other information stored in a tag.
3.2.4 Definitions of the Attacks
Attacks on Privacy
Tracking attack : An adversary is able to trace and/or identify a tag in future communi-
cation.
Anonymity attack : After analyzing the transmitted messages between reader and tags,
an adversary is able to differentiate specific tags’ secrets or the reader’s secrets.
Forward security attack : After intercepting or eavesdropping on a tag’s communication
during a protocol run and corrupting the tag to obtain its secrets, an adversary can identify
that tag in previous runs of the protocol.
Message integrity attack : An adversary can modify messages to a reader/tag, and the
reader/tag cannot detect it.
Attacks on Security
Impersonation:
• Impersonate tag to reader - An adversary captures tags’ secrets or other tags’ data
that allow it to impersonate the tag to the reader.
• Impersonate reader to tag - An adversary sends a message to a tag that the tag accepts
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as if was from a legitimate reader, then either a proof fails or as a result the tag’s privacy
is compromised.
• Impersonate reader to verifier - An adversary captures the reader’s secrets that allow
it to impersonate the reader to the verifier.
Concurrency attack : While a grouping proof protocol is executing, additional readers
execute the grouping proof protocol on the same group of tags, spoiling the current or future
grouping proofs.
Desynchronization: An adversary causes tags to assume a state from which they can no
longer participate in the protocol properly.
Denial of proof : When an adversary attempts to force a proof to fail on reader-end
and/or tag-end in various ways.
Replay attack : After intercepting a tag’s (or reader’s) communication, an adversary
replays that message intending to extract further information from the reader (or tag) or
desynchronize the reader and tag.
In our work we are mainly concerned with security issues at the protocol and application
layer. We are not concerned with physical or link layer issues, such as the coupling design
and the power-up.
3.3 Formal Untraceability Analysis
Establishing proof of security and privacy in a clear and precise model is a major concern
in the area of RFID protocols. The RFID research community has developed many such
models. See Coisel and Martin [28] for a survey in privacy models. We choose to evaluate
our protocols with the untraceability model presented by Avoine et al. [8].
This model captures different privacy levels of the protocols. Compared to other models,
the model of Avoine et al. structures its attributes differently to enhance its capabilities and
fairness to analyze the untraceability level of RFID protocols.
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This untraceability model provides us with an easily applicable model that meaningfully
evaluates the privacy of our protocols. The model uses adversary actions (oracles), capabil-
ities (selectors and restrictions), and goals (experiment) and gives the flexibility to modify
adversarial assumptions if needed.
Below we describe the Avoine et al. model. Their paper [8] provides more details.
3.3.1 Description of the Avoine et al. Untraceability Model
The RFID System in the Model
An RFID system S defines three building blocks (more details in [8]):
• The architecture comprises three kinds of entities: tags, readers, and a verifier (database).
System architectures fall into two categories based on the numbers of readers: single-
entity (SE) and multiple-entity (ME). In our untraceability analysis, we consider only
SE (RFID system architecture with a single autonomous reader).
• Initialization procedures include generating system secrets, registering and initializing
tags, and preauthorizing a reader R to execute the protocol on tags T .
• Protocol Prot is a sequence of steps to achieve a well-defined objective. Prot involves
one or more entities, where each entity executes its own algorithm to reach the protocol
objective. An algorithm is the set of steps and transitions (an internal or external event
required by an entity to move to the next step). When an entity executes an algorithm
that exchanges data with other involved entities, call the record of exchanged data as
a transcript. A transcript can include, for example, the reception/emission time of a
message, message’s issuer and/or recipient, etc. Each algorithm execution may further
modify the entity’s internal state.
The Untraceability Experiment
In the untraceability experiment UNT, the adversary A can interact with the system
S within some limitations, which define different adversary classes. UNT also includes an
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honest entity, challenger C, and challenge tags.
The notion of a challenge tag is a tag that is a target of an attack performed by A [8, 28].
A can choose challenge tags. A does not interfere with the challenger C (honest entity)
during the experiment with the challenge tags.
In UNT experiment, at some point A selects two challenge tags, i and j. A has access to
all the transcripts of communications to and from all tags, and it has the identities of which
messages are to/from which tags. Challenger C relabels the two challenge tags as ĩ and j̃
with respect to a random bit b such that if b = 0, then ĩ = i and j̃ = j (that is, the labels
remain the same), but if b = 1, then ĩ = j and j̃ = i (that is, C swaps the labels). C executes
the protocol c1 times on Tag ĩ and c2 times on Tag j̃ without interference from A, then
provides the transcripts of these executions to A. Depending on the untraceability class, A
may or may not be able to corrupt some tags. A can run further executions of the protocol,
interacting with the tags. Finally, A must determine the value of b. If the probability that
A can correctly determine b is not very different from 1
2
, then the protocol is untraceable in
that class. Below we quote the following two definitions from Avoine et al. [8].
Definition 1 (P-Universal untraceability). An RFID system S is said P-Universal
untraceable, denoted P-Universal-UNT, if:
∀(c1, c2) ∈ N2, ∀Ap ∈ P ,∀b ∈ {0, 1}:∣∣∣Pr (ExpUNTS,Ap (λ, b, c1, c2) −→ 1)− 1/2∣∣∣ ≤ ε(λ),
where ε is a negligible function in the security parameter λ.
Definition 2 (P-Existential untraceability). An RFID system S is said P-Existential
untraceable, denoted P-Existential-UNT, if:
∃(c1, c2) ∈ N2, ∀Ap ∈ P ,∀b ∈ {0, 1}:∣∣∣Pr (ExpUNTS,Ap (λ, b, c1, c2) −→ 1)− 1/2∣∣∣ ≤ ε(λ),
where ε is a negligible function in the security parameter λ.
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Adversary Classes
The collection of attributes (actions, capabilities, goals) available to the adversary gives
rise to the concept of adversary class. The Avoine et al. [8] model formalizes the actions
that can be carried out on an RFID system with oracles. An oracle allows an adversary A to
interact with the system S and collect data. Example oracles include the abilities to interact
with the tags and reader by eavesdropping, blocking messages, tampering with messages,
spoofing reader or tag, and corrupting a tag to obtain all of its secrets
Two typical adversary classes are CLASSIC and STRONG.
For the class CLASSIC, A cannot corrupt any tags. The adversary A can interact with
the tags and reader by eavesdropping, blocking messages, tampering with messages, and
spoofing reader or tag.
For the class STRONG, A can corrupt any tags, including the challenge tags, and can
interact with the tags and reader by eavesdropping, blocking messages, tampering with
messages, spoofing reader or tag.
There are three classes defined between those two in the model - FORWARD, BACKWARD,
and SIDE.
• FORWARD - Tags i and j cannot be corrupted, but ĩ, j̃, and non-challenge tags can
be corrupted.
• BACKWARD - Tags ĩ and j̃ cannot be corrupted, but i, j, and non-challenge tags can
be corrupted.
• SIDE - Both FORWARD and BACKWARD restrictions must be respected, meaning that
challenge tags cannot be corrupted but non-challenge tags can.
Universal and Existential Untraceabilities
The notions of Universal-UNT and Existential-UNT depend on restrictions about the
choices of c1, c2 (parameters of the experiment). The restrictions are defined as follows.
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• Universal-UNT - C executes the protocol and (c1, c2) can be any number of executions
of the protocol, including (0, 0).
• Existential-UNT - C executes the protocol c1 times on Tag ĩ and c2 times on Tag j̃ for
some specified numbers (c1, c2)
In Sections 4.4.2 and 5.4.2, we apply the untraceability model to provide a formal com-
prehensive evaluation of our protocols within the adversary classes defined above considering
universal and existential untraceability.
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CHAPTER 4
SERIAL - DEPENDENCY GROUPING PROOF PROTOCOL
4.1 Introduction
Motivated by the SDZ Protocol, we develop the Serial-Dependency Grouping Proof Pro-
tocol (SDGPP) that reduces the amount of communication and computation, addresses
security gaps, removes the outside trusted timestamp server, and prevents a compromised
tag from spoiling the entire proof. Our light version of the SDZ serial-dependency protocol
preserves the security and privacy properties of the original protocol. Also, we use the EPC
specified settling-time intervals for tags to limit the time duration of the protocol. We re-
move the dependency on a specific reader to make the protocol suitable for applications like
a supply chain with different readers at different locations for the same group.
We analyzed untraceability of SDGPP in Section 4.4.2. Later, in Chapter 5 (Section 5.5)
we will compare the security and performance of SDGPP to that of other protocols, including
our PDGPP.
4.2 Motivation
Below is a review of the Sundaresan et al. [106] (SDZ) grouping-proof protocol in detail,
because the paper’s protocol motivated our work.
The Sundaresan et al. [106] (SDZ) grouping-proof protocol uses secrets shared by reader
and tags and other group- and tag-specific secrets held by tags to perform mutual authen-
tication as well as verify the integrity of the exchanged messages. The SDZ protocol builds
around a “zero-knowledge property” that enables a tag to convince the verifier of its pres-
ence without revealing its identity or any tracking information to the reader or the adversary.
The essence of this technique is as follows. The tag selects one bit of a secret shared with
Part of this chapter was previously published as Vanya Cherneva and Jerry Trahan, (2018)“Serial-
Dependency Grouping-Proof Protocol for RFID EPC C1G2 Tags,” 2018 IEEE Green Energy and Smart
Systems Conference (IGESSC)
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the verifier. The tag generates a random number ri, then, depending on the value of the
bit of the shared secret, transmits either the square (r2i mod p) or the pseudosquare (w · r2i
mod p). The verifier uses the prime factors of modulus p to distinguish square from pseu-
dosquare, while it is computationally infeasible for the reader or adversary to do so without
these factors. The protocol assumes a trusted timestamp-server that provides an encrypted
timestamp to the reader before each communication with a tag. Unlike the offline verifier,
this timestamp-server must remain connected to the reader. During the initialization phase,
the verifier loads information on reader and tags. The reader receives values including reader-
specific RH, group-specific GH, and tag-specific values for u protocol runs for each tag and
each group. Each tag receives values including RH, GH, and tag-specific TH(i). During the
proof generation phase, the reader sends information to a tag, receives a response from that
tag, then moves on to the next tag in turn. The information sent to Tag i includes K(i− 1)
calculated by the preceding tag, Tag i− 1. Folding together a fresh random number, secrets
shared with Tag i, and information loaded by the verifier (that itself folds in secrets shared
with Tag i), the reader sends eight items of data to the tag. Tag i extracts the random
number and then extracts GH and TH(i). If they match stored values of GH and TH(i),
then the tag has authenticated the reader and confirmed the integrity of the data sent by the
reader. If they do not match, then the tag tries again using stored values from its previous
run of the protocol. (This permits a tag one run out of synchronization with the reader to
regain synchronization. The update scheme prevents a tag from getting more than one run
out of synchronization with the reader in some, but not all, circumstances.) The tag uses
the zero-knowledge technique to compute a value K(i) to send to the reader then builds a
value L(i) including this K(i) and a stored hash RH of the reader ID. Receiving K(i) and
L(i), the reader extracts RH to authenticate the tag and ensure the integrity of the message.
During the proof construction phase, the reader collects RH, GH, run number, the random
number and encrypted timestamp used for each tag, and the K(i) and L(i) values received
from tags. It then encrypts this collection using a secret shared with the verifier.
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The SDZ protocol has many strong points. These include use of a hashed group ID
to permit the reader to authenticate a tag without divulging the tag’s ID, the use of ran-
dom numbers to keep communications fresh across runs and prevent an eavesdropper from
tracking, the use of the zero-knowledge technique, and checking the integrity of each com-
munication. The SDZ protocol, however, also has weak points. (i) The protocol assumes the
presence of a trusted timestamp-server always connected to the reader. (ii) A tag can par-
ticipate only with a specific reader. (iii) An adversary can desynchronize a tag by blocking
its messages in consecutive runs. (iv) Checking extracted vs. stored values for all of RH,
GH, and TH(i) is redundant. (v) Reader and tags exchange many data items. (vi) A tag
does not check the integrity of the K value sent to it by the reader. We have proposed a
protocol that addresses these points.
4.3 Description of SDGPP
The protocol has three phases: initialization, grouping-proof collection, and proof-verification.
Table 4.1 describes notation used in the protocols.
4.3.1 Initialization Phase
In the initialization phase, the verifier pre-computes information for u protocol runs and
stores this information in the reader and also stores one set of values in each tag.
Reader: The verifier initializes the reader with the following values: independent of
group and run - {RH, sR, Krv}, where Krv is a secret key shared between verifier and the
reader; group-specific - {GH,nextrun(1 . . .m)}, where each nextrun(i) = 1 and m is the
number of tags in the group; group- and run-specific - {J, µ(1 . . .m), sRT (1 . . .m)}. The
reader starts with seedR initiated by verifier (can be once or specific to a group or specific
to a run on a group or specific to a tag in a run on a group).
Tags: The verifier initializes each Tag i with the following values: independent of
group and run - {TH(i)}; group-specific - {GH, sG, sT (i), p, w, cV }; group- and run-specific
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- {sV T (i), s−1V T (i), sRT (i), s
−1
RT (i)}, where s
−1
V T (i), s
−1
RT (i) are initialized to 0. Tag i starts a
run with seedT (i) for its PRNG, initiated by verifier. Tags store no values specific to an
individual reader (as opposed to the SDZ protocol). This modification allows the protocol to
be processed from any reader pre-authorized from the verifier. Our protocol uses the timing
requirement built in EPC GS1 version 2 [40]. Tags execute any command (in any state)
within a certain default time controlled by the cV preset timing variable. Tags must respond
in this time window to be part of the grouping proof.
Table 4.1. Notation for SDGPP
Notations Description
sV 1, sV 2, sV 3 Unique secrets known only to the verifier
GID(k), GH Group ID GH(k) = h(GID(k), sV 1), where h is a hash function
TID(i), TH(i) Unique Tag ID TH(i) = h(TID(i), sV 2)
RID(j), RH Unique reader ID RH(j) = h(RID(j), sV 3)
rV Run-specific PRN generated by the verifier
J J = GH ⊕ PRNG(sG ⊕ rV ), where PRNG is a pseudorandom number
generator
µ(i) µ(i) = PRNG(TH(i)⊕ sV T (i))⊕ (x||y||z||rV )
seedR seed for the reader PRNG function
rR(i) PRN generated by the reader for Tag i
sR Secret key unique to each reader in the system
sG Shared group secret among group tags, sG(k)
sV T (i), s
−1
V T (i) sV T (i) (s
−1




RT (i) sRT (i) (s
−1
RT (i)) is a secret shared between reader and Tag i for current
(previous) run
sT (i), sT (i, x) Secret key unique to Tag i; sT (i, x) is 128-bit string and x is index of
128-bit string in sT (i)
seedT (i) seed for Tag i PRNG function
rT (i, index) PRN generated by Tag i
x, y, z Indices used in zero-knowledge proof
p, w Values for zero-knowledge proof
cV Time constant to limit activity in a protocol run
4.3.2 Grouping-Proof Collection Phase
Figure 4.1 is a view of the messages exchanged among reader and tags in SDGPP. During
the grouping-proof collection phase, the verifier does not connect to the reader or tags. When
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Reader
−→ Jr(1), µr(1), δ(1) to Tag 1
Tag 1
←− K(1), L(1) to Reader
Reader
−→ Jr(2),Klast, µr(2), δ(2) to Tag 2
Tag 2




−→ Jr(i),Klast, µr(i), δ(i) to Tag i
Tag i




←− K(m), L(m) to Reader
Figure 4.1. SDGPP messages
in a run, the reader places all tags in a group in open state. This starts the time window
controlled by cV .
Reader - Round 1
use J , µ(1), sRT (1) from nextrun(1)
rR(1)← PRNG(seedR)
seedR ← rR(1)⊕ sR
Jr(1)← J ⊕ rR(1)
µr(1)← µ(1)⊕ rR(1)
δ(1)← sRT (1)⊕ rR(1)
Send to Tag 1: Jr(1), µr(1), δ(1)
Figure 4.2. Round 1
Round 1 - Reader
The reader uses a run value nextrun(1) on which the reader expects Tag 1 to be. The
reader selects values for J , µ(1), and sRT (1) for Tag 1 according to this run value. The reader
generates a fresh pseudo-random number rR(1) and XORs this with precomputed values to
produce Jr(1), µr(1), δ(1). The randomness from rR(1) keeps messages fresh across runs and
avoids sending values in the clear. The reader sends three values to Tag 1 compared to seven
in the SDZ protocol.
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Tag 1 - Round 1
synch← 1
rR(1)← δ(1)⊕ sRT (1)
; Use extracted rR(1) to remove randomness
J ← Jr(1)⊕ rR(1)
µ(1)← µr(1)⊕ rR(1)
x||y||z||rV ← PRNG(TH(1)⊕ sV T (1))⊕ µ(1)
; Tag 1 uses stored TH(1), sV T (1) to obtain rV
GH ← J ⊕ PRNG(sG ⊕ rV )
; rV obtained from µ(1) used to extract GH from J
if (extracted GH 6= stored GH)
; if equal, then Group ID verified
; and message integrity of J and µ(1) verified
; else reader and Tag 1 runs not synchronized
; so use s−1RT (1), s
−1
V T (1) and try again
synch← 0
rR(1)← δ(1)⊕ s−1RT (1)
J ← Jr(1)⊕ rR(1)
µ(1)← µr(1)⊕ rR(1)
x||y||z||rV ← PRNG(TH(1)⊕ s−1V T (1))⊕ µ(1)
GH ← J ⊕ PRNG(sG ⊕ rV )
if (extracted GH 6= stored GH)
abort
S(1)← sT (1, x)⊕ PRNG(TH(1)⊕ sT (1, y))
⊕PRNG(sT (1, z)⊕ rV )
K(1)← null
for index ∈ {x, y, z}
rT (1, index)← PRNG(seedT (1))
seedT (1)← rT (1, index)
if S(1)[index] = 0
Z ← (rT (1, index))2 mod p
else ; that is, S(1)[index] = 1
Z ← w · (rT (1, index))2 mod p
K(1)← K(1)||Z
L(1)← GH ⊕ PRNG((Jr(1)||K(1))⊕ rR(1))
seedT (1)← PRNG(seedT (1))
if synch = 1
s−1RT (1)← sRT (1)
sRT (1)← PRNG(sRT (1))
s−1V T (1)← sV T (1)
sV T (1)← PRNG(sV T (1))
Send to reader: K(1), L(1)
Figure 4.3. Round 1
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Round 1 - Tag 1
Tag 1 authenticates the reader, verifies the integrity of the incoming messages, and com-
putes its response using zero-knowledge techniques. Tag 1 performs the following steps. It
authenticates that the reader is authorized by the verifier and confirms the integrity of mes-
sages received from the reader. If the verification fails, Tag 1 tries again using a different set
of values from the previous run because the tag may be at most one run ahead of (out of
synchronization with) the reader, so this allows it to resynchronize. Tag 1 has a synch flag
that marks whether it uses values from its current or previous run. Tag 1 next computes
values that will establish its presence to the verifier. Our protocol uses the zero knowledge
property from SDZ described in Section 4.2. Tag 1 sends K(1) and L(1) to the reader. This
is two values compared to three in the SDZ protocol.
Round i - Reader
In a round i, where 2 ≤ i ≤ m, if the reader does not receive a response from Tag i− 1
within a defined time window, it moves on to Tag i, leaving Tag i− 1 marked as not valid.
Reader - Round i (2 ≤ i ≤ m)
if reader received K(i− 1), L(i− 1) from Tag i− 1
GH ← L(i− 1)⊕ PRNG((Jr(i− 1)||K(i− 1))⊕ rR(i− 1))
if (extracted GH = stored GH))
nextrun(i− 1) = nextrun(i− 1) + 1
Klast ← K(i− 1)
; Klast is the last good K value received from a tag
mark Tag i− 1 as valid
else
discard K(i− 1), L(i− 1)
; if reader did not receive K(1), L(1) from Tag 1
; or if K(1), L(1) did not extract proper GH,
; then reader treats next tag as “Tag 1”
use J , µ(i), sRT (i) from nextrun(i)
rR(i)← PRNG(seedR)
seedR ← rR(i)⊕ sR
Jr(i)← J ⊕Klast ⊕ rR(i)
µr(i)← µ(i)⊕ rR(i)
δ(i)← sRT (i)⊕ rR(i)
Send to Tag i: Jr(i),Klast, µr(i), δ(i)
Figure 4.4. Round i – Reader
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Tag i - Round i (2 ≤ i ≤ m)
synch← 1
rR(i)← δ(i)⊕ sRT (i)
; Use extracted rR(i) to remove randomness
J ← Jr(i)⊕Klast ⊕ rR(i)
µ(i)← µr(i)⊕ rR(i)
x||y||z||rV ← PRNG(TH(i)⊕ sV T (i))⊕ µ(i)
; Tag i uses stored values TH(i), sV T (i) to obtain rV
GH ← J ⊕ PRNG(sG ⊕ rV )
; rV obtained from µ(i) used to extract GH from J
if (extracted GH 6= stored GH)
; if equal, then Group ID verified
; and message integrity of J , Klast, and µ(i) verified
; else reader and Tag i runs not synchronized,
; so use s−1RT (i), s
−1
V T (i) and try again
synch← 0
rR(i)← δ(i)⊕ s−1RT (i)
J ← Jr(i)⊕Klast ⊕ rR(i)
µ(i)← µr(i)⊕ rR(i)
x||y||z||rV ← PRNG(TH(i)⊕ s−1V T (i))⊕ µ(i)
GH ← J ⊕ PRNG(sG ⊕ rV )
if (extracted GH 6= stored GH)
abort
S(i)← sT (i, x)⊕ PRNG(TH(i)⊕ sT (i, y))
⊕PRNG(Klast ⊕ sT (i, z)⊕ rV )
K(i)← null
for index ∈ {x, y, z}
rT (i, index)← PRNG(seedT (i))
seedT (i)← rT (i, index)
if S(i)[index] = 0
Z ← (rT (i, index))2 mod p
else ; that is, S(i)[index] = 1
Z ← w · (rT (i, index))2 mod p
K(i)← K(i)||Z
L(i)← GH ⊕ PRNG((Jr(i)||K(i))⊕ rR(i))
seedT (i)← PRNG(seedT (i))
if synch = 1
s−1RT (i)← sRT (i)
sRT (i)← PRNG(sRT (i))
s−1V T (i)← sV T (i)
sV T (i)← PRNG(sV T (i))
Send to reader: K(i), L(i)
Figure 4.5. Round i – Tag i
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If the reader does receive a response from Tag i − 1, it extracts the hashed Group ID GH.
If the extracted GH matches the stored GH, this authenticates Tag i− 1 and also confirms
the integrity of the messages K(i− 1) and L(i− 1). Otherwise, the response is not valid and
the reader discards K(i − 1), L(i − 1). For the case of Tag 1, if the reader did not receive
K(1), L(1) or extract the proper GH, then it treats the next tag as “Tag 1”. The reader
maintains a value Klast, which is the last valid K value received from a tag. If the response
from Tag i−1 was valid, then the reader updates Klast. The reader acts for Tag i much as it
did for Tag 1. Differences involve Klast: the reader XORs it into Jr(i) to allow an integrity
check and sends it directly sent to Tag i. The reader sends four values to Tag i versus eight
in the SDZ protocol.
Round i - Tag i
Tag i’s actions are much like those of Tag 1 with differences involving Klast.
4.3.3 Proof - Verification
The reader compiles all partial proofs from valid tags’ messages to construct the proof
P = {RH,GH, run, (i, nextrun(i), K(i), L(i), rR(i))} with information from all valid tags i.
Then the reader encrypts proof P as P ′ using the secret key Krv shared with the verifier.
The reader sends P ′ to the verifier either immediately or at a later time with more proofs.
Verification Phase
The verifier decrypts P ′ using the shared secret key Krv. Using RH, GH, and run, the
verifier identifies which reader sent the proof, the tag group, and the run of the protocol for
that group. For each Tag i, the verifier computes S(i). Using K(i), p, and w, the verifier
distinguishes between squares and pseudosquares and decodes the tag- and run-specific bits.




4.4.1 Security and Privacy Properties
We now establish that our protocol resists the attacks that the SDZ protocol [106] targets.
See Sundaresan et al. [106] for a comparison to other protocols. For definitions of these
attacks, see Section 3.2.4 and [15, 73, 87, 100, 106, 122, 127].
Privacy: The reader and tags never send Tag ID and group ID information in the clear
but always as part of a value computed with XOR or PRNG. The reader XORs values sent
to a tag with a new random value each run, even if nextrun(i) does not change. The K(i)
and L(i) values sent by a tag change each run because they build on fresh random numbers.
So an adversary cannot track the same tag from the information exchanged from one run
to the next. Attacks and other considerations relevant to privacy include tracking attack,
anonymity attack, and forward security. Section 4.4.2 gives a more thorough analysis of
untraceability and forward security.
Impersonation attacks: Impersonation attacks include three variants: (i) impersonate tag
to reader; (ii) impersonate reader to tag; and (iii) impersonate reader to verifier. (Attacks
under this category include forgery, illegitimate tag, subset replay, and multi-proof-session
attacks.) (i) Without GH and rR(i), an adversary cannot construct an L(i) value that a
reader will accept when the reader checks the match between extracted and stored GH. (ii)
Without sRT (i), sV T (i), TH(i), and sG, an adversary cannot construct values that Tag i will
accept when it checks the match between extracted and stored GH. (iii) The reader sends
proof P in encrypted form P ′ using a key shared with the verifier, so without this key, the
adversary cannot send a P ′ that the verifier will decode into valid information. Furthermore,
besides this encryption, an adversary cannot insert into a proof P information from a missing
tag because the chaining of K values would not be consistent. Observe that an adversary
cannot extract GH, rR(i), sRT (i), etc. from transmitted values.
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Concurrency attack: This attack is when multiple readers simultaneously try to generate
grouping proofs for the same tags. From the RFID specification [40], once a tag is in open
state to one reader, it does not respond to others. So, after a reader places a tag in open
state at the start of a run, the tag will complete its participation in this grouping proof
before responding to another reader.
Desynchronization: For each Tag i, the reader tracks nextrun(i), which is the run at
which it expects the tag to be during the next proof. Each tag maintains sRT (i) and sV T (i)
for the current run and s−1RT (i) and s
−1
V T (i) from its previous run. With selective updates
of these, a tag can be at most one run ahead of the reader even if the adversary blocks
messages. In that circumstance, the tag uses s−1RT (i) and s
−1
V T (i) to successfully compute its
outputs.
Denial of proof: An adversary can attempt to force a proof to fail in various ways, and
the protocol counters each of these. It can block or tamper with messages to desynchronize
reader and tags (see above for resolution), it can block or tamper with messages to break
the chain across tags (the use of Klast from the last valid tag resolves this), and it can
impersonate illegitimate tags (see above for resolution).
Replay attack: If an adversary replayed a message from a Tag i to the reader, the reader
would find it not valid because it will not incorporate the current Jr(i − 1) and rR(i − 1)
values. If an adversary replayed a message from the reader to Tag i from more than one
run previously, then Tag i would abort. But for a replay attack from the immediately
previous run for Tag i, the tag would not detect the replay attack, as it would see this as an
instance of being one run ahead of the reader. Tag i would reply with fresh values built on
fresh pseudorandom numbers (see above under privacy), and it would not update anything,
so this would not cause any future harm to our protocol. (The same applies to the SDZ
protocol.)
Message Integrity attack: A tag extracts GH from δ(i), µr(i), Klast, and Jr(i). A reader
extracts GH from K(i) and L(i). In both cases, a match between extracted and stored GH
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confirms the integrity of received messages.
4.4.2 Untraceability Analysis of SDGPP
In this section, we classify SDGPP in the untraceability model of Avoine et al. [8]. We
will establish that SDGPP is SIDE-Universal-UNT and FORWARD-Existential-UNT but is not
FORWARD-Universal-UNT.
Recall from Section 3.3.1 the following. A selects two challenge tags, i and j. Challenger
C relabels the two challenge tags as ĩ and j̃ with respect to a random bit b such that if b = 0,
then ĩ = i and j̃ = j (that is, the labels remain the same), but if b = 1, then ĩ = j and j̃ = i
(that is, C swaps the labels). A must determine the value of b. If the probability that A can
correctly determine b is not very different from 1
2
, then the protocol is untraceable in that
class.
For the class SIDE-Universal-UNT, ASIDE cannot corrupt the challenge tags, but can cor-
rupt any other tags immediately after C relabels the tags or after any number of executions
of the protocol. That is, (c1, c2) can be any values, including (0, 0).
For the class FORWARD-Existential-UNT, AFORWARD can corrupt the challenge tags and
any other tags after C executes the protocol c1 times on Tag ĩ and c2 times on Tag j̃ for
some specified numbers (c1, c2).
For the class FORWARD-Universal-UNT, AFORWARD can corrupt the challenge tags and
any other tags immediately after C relabels the tags or after any number of executions of
the protocol. That is, (c1, c2) can be any values, including (0, 0).
Theorem 4.4.1 SDGPP is SIDE-Universal-UNT.
Proof. For the SIDE-Universal-UNT class, adversary ASIDE cannot corrupt the challenge
tags but can corrupt any other tags. ASIDE can also obtain transcripts of communications to
and from all tags in all executions of the protocol.
For universal untraceability, (c1, c2) can be any values, and proving untraceability with
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(c1, c2) = (0, 0) suffices [8]. That is, when ASIDE has selected Tags i and j, it has access to all
transcripts for all tags in all previous executions of SDGPP, and it has the information on
which of these transcripts belong to which tags, including i and j. After the last execution of
SDGPP, ASIDE can corrupt all non-challenge tags, and ASIDE receives all transcripts of com-
munications, however, the Challenger labels the transcripts for i and j in the last execution
as belonging to ĩ and j̃ according to a random selection by the Challenger.
To establish that i = j̃, ASIDE would have to establish that Tag i in one of the previous
executions is the same as Tag j̃. To do this, ASIDE would have to calculate K(i) or L(i) from
the information it has obtained from transcripts and from corrupted non-challenge tags using
information that matches Tag j̃ . From the communication transcripts, ASIDE holds that Tag
i received inputs Jr(i), Klast (for i), µr(i), δ(i) and produced outputs K(i), L(i), while Tag
j̃ received inputs Jr(j̃), Klast (for j̃), µr(j̃), δ(j̃) and produced outputs K(j̃), L(j̃). For each
non-challenge Tag q, ASIDE can extract all its stored information (that is, TH(q), GH, sG,
sT (q), p, w, cV , sV T (q), s
−1
V T (q), sRT (q), s
−1
RT (q), and seedT (q)). Also, for Tag q, ASIDE can
calculate all values in the corresponding run of SDGPP for Tag q up through S(q) (that is,
rR(q); J for q; µ(q); x, y, z, and rV for q; and S(q)).
Even if i = j̃ and even if the run used s−1RT (j̃) = sRT (i), K(j̃) will be different from
K(i). This is because Tag j̃ generated fresh pseudorandom rT (j̃, index) values to build K(j̃).
Correspondingly, L(j̃) will be different from L(j) again due to different pseudorandom values
K(j̃) and rR(j̃). Secrets and calculations from non-challenge tags do not change this.
Because ASIDE does not have sRT (i), it cannot extract rR(i). Also, ASIDE cannot calculate
rR(i) from rR(i− 1) because of how the reader changes the seed used in the pseudorandom
generation of rR(i). So, ASIDE cannot extract x, y, z, and rV and so cannot calculate S(i) and
so cannot calculate K(i). Also, even with GH obtained by corruption of other tags, Jr(i)
obtained from the transcript, and K(i) obtained from the transcript, ASIDE cannot calculate
L(i) without rR(i). Therefore, ASIDE cannot match Tag j̃ with Tag i any better than it can
match Tag ĩ. 2
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Theorem 4.4.2 SDGPP is FORWARD-Existential-UNT.
Proof. For the FORWARD-Existential-UNT class, adversary AFORWARD can corrupt all tags,
including the challenge tags, after the Challenger executes the protocol without interference
from AFORWARD for a specific number of times. In this proof, we will use (c1, c2) = (2, 2),
meaning that the Challenger will execute SDGPP for two full executions before AFORWARD
corrupts any tags. AFORWARD can also obtain transcripts of communications to and from all
tags in all executions of the protocol.
To establish that i = j̃, AFORWARD would have to establish that Tag i in one of the
previous executions is the same as Tag j̃ in the last execution. To do this, AFORWARD would
have to calculate K(i) or L(i) from the information it has obtained from transcripts and
from corrupted tags. The proof of Theorem 4.4.1 describes the relevant information from
transcripts and from corruption, but in the current proof, the corrupted tags also include
challenge tags ĩ and j̃.
In the selected execution of Tag i, let sRT (i) = β and s
−1
RT (i) = α at the end of the run.
Whether Tag i was synchronized or desynchronized with the reader at the start of the run,
it would have used α as the sRT value during that run. We will examine cases in which
i = j̃ and the two executions of SDGPP by the Challenger immediately follow the selected
execution of Tag i. If other executions are between these, then the conclusions still hold.
Consider the case where Tag i is synchronized with the reader at the end of its run, which
means that Tag j̃ is synchronized at the start of the first execution by the Challenger. This
will be the case if AFORWARD allows the message from Tag i to reach the reader intact. The
first execution by the Challenger on Tag j̃ will use sRT value β. At the end of that execution,
sRT (j̃) = γ and s
−1
RT (j̃) = β. Tag j̃ no longer holds the value α.
Consider next the case where Tag i is desynchronized with the reader at the end of its
run, which means that Tag j̃ is desynchronized at the start of the first execution by the
Challenger. This will be the case if AFORWARD blocks the message from Tag i from reaching
the reader or tampers with the message. The first execution by the Challenger on Tag j̃ will
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use sRT value α. At the end of that execution, sRT (j̃) = β and s
−1
RT (j̃) = α because the tag
does not update these in a desynchronized execution. Tag j̃ is now synchronized with the
reader. The second execution by the Challenger on Tag j̃ will use sRT value β. At the end
of that execution, sRT (j̃) = γ and s
−1
RT (j̃) = β. Tag j̃ no longer holds the value α.
In both cases, by the arguments above in the proof of Theorem 4.4.1, because the cor-
rupted Tag j̃ does not hold sRT value α used by Tag i, AFORWARD cannot determine rR(i),
so it cannot calculate either K(i) or L(i). Therefore, AFORWARD cannot match Tag j̃ with
Tag i any better than it can match Tag ĩ. 2
Theorem 4.4.3 SDGPP is not FORWARD-Universal-UNT.
Proof. For the FORWARD-Universal-UNT class, adversary AFORWARD can corrupt all tags,
including the challenge tags, after the Challenger executes the protocol without interference
from AFORWARD for any adversary-specified number of times (including zero). In this proof,
we will use (c1, c2) = (1, 1), meaning that the Challenger will execute SDGPP for one full
execution before AFORWARD corrupts any tags. AFORWARD can also obtain transcripts of
communications to and from all tags in all executions of the protocol.
Suppose that i = j̃. To establish that i = j̃, AFORWARD will have to establish that
Tag i in one of the previous executions is the same as Tag j̃ in the last execution. To do
this, AFORWARD will calculate L(i) from the information it has obtained from transcripts and
from corrupted tags. The proof of Theorem 4.4.1 describes the relevant information from
transcripts and from corruption, but in the current proof, the corrupted tags also include
challenge tags ĩ and j̃.
During the selected execution with Tags i and j, AFORWARD blocks messages from Tags i
and j to the reader (or tampers with these messages), so that Tags i and j are desynchronized
with the reader at the end of the execution. The Challenger then immediately executes
SDGPP once, then AFORWARD corrupts the challenge Tags ĩ and j̃.
In the selected execution of Tag i, let sRT (i) = β and s
−1
RT (i) = α at the end of the
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run. Whether Tag i was synchronized or desynchronized with the reader at the start of
the run, it would have used α as the sRT value during that run. Because the execution by
the challenger C begins with Tags ĩ and j̃ desynchronized with the reader, neither Tag ĩ
nor Tag j̃ updates its sRT values. So, s
−1
RT (i) = s
−1
RT (j̃) = α. Using s
−1
RT (j̃) = α and δ(1)
from the transcript of Tag i in the selected run, AFORWARD extracts rR(i) used by Tag i.
Then with GH (via corruption), Jr(i) (via transcript), K(i) (via transcript), and rR(i) (just
calculated), AFORWARD calculates L(i) and matches it with the L(i) value in the transcript




PARALLEL - DEPENDENCY GROUPING PROOF PROTOCOL
5.1 Introduction
In parallel grouping-proofs, the reader broadcasts communications to all tags. All tags
that receive the message compute in parallel then communicate back to the reader one at
a time. Because of use in large-scale applications, the number of tagged items read may
be significantly high. Therefore, scalability tailored to privacy and security is an important
challenge that affects the RFID system quality when designing a protocol.
5.2 Motivation
This chapter presents the Parallel-Dependency Grouping Proof Protocol (PDGPP) moti-
vated by SDGPP. We adapt the serial-dependency protocol idea to reduce protocol execution
time by overlapping tag computation times.
Many grouping-proof protocols exist, but these often do not satisfy all aspects of privacy,
security, and efficiency. PDGPP has parallel dependency among tags, extends the security
and privacy properties, and improves on efficiency, scalability, and resilience over existing
schemes. Out proposed protocol withstands a range of attacks on security and privacy, but
it does trade a weakened untraceability for improved scalability with respect to SDGPP. It
is lightweight and scalable for large systems while remaining in compliance with the EPC
Class 1 Gen 2 (C1G2) standard.
5.3 Description of PDGPP
PDGPP has two rounds. In the first round, the reader broadcasts a message to all tags
and receives their replies. Then, in the second round, the reader uses these replies to build
a message that it broadcasts to all tags (for parallel dependency) and receives their replies
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that incorporate this message. The reader builds a proof from the tags’ replies, encrypts it,
and sends it to the verifier. Figure 5.1 is a view of the messages exchanged among reader
and tags in PDGPP.
Reader
−→ Jr(1), ηr, δ(1) to all tags
Tag 1
←− K(1, 1), L(1, 1), tar(1, 1) to Reader
...
Tag i
←− K(i, 1), L(i, 1), tar(i, 1) to Reader
...
Tag m
←− K(m, 1), L(m, 1), tar(m, 1) to Reader
Reader
−→ Jr(2),K∗, δ(2) to all tags
Tag 1
←− Q(1, 2), L(1, 2), tar(1, 2) to Reader
...
Tag m
←− Q(m, 2), L(m, 2), tar(m, 2) to Reader
Figure 5.1. PDGPP messages
We now describe in detail the three phases of the protocol: initialization, grouping-proof
collection, and proof verification. Table 5.1 describes notation used in the protocol.
5.3.1 Initialization Phase
In the initialization phase, the verifier pre-computes information for u protocol runs
and stores this information in the reader and also stores one set of values in each tag (see
Table 5.2).
Reader: Because the reader broadcasts its messages to all tags, the verifier loads it with
values that are not specific to any individual tag. The verifier initializes the reader with the
following values (see Table 5.2) - independent of group and run: {RH,KRV }; group-specific:
{GH, sRT}; group- and run-specific {run, J, η}. The reader starts with seedR initiated by
verifier (can be once or specific to a group or specific to a run on a group).
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Table 5.1. Notation for PDGPP
Notations Description
sV 1, sV 2, sV 3 unique secrets known only to the verifier
GID(k), GH group ID GH(k) = h(GID(k), sV 1), where h is a hash function
TID(i), TH(i) unique Tag ID TH(i) = h(TID(i), sV 2)
RID(j), RH unique reader ID RH(j) = h(RID(j), sV 3)
KRV secret key shared between reader and the verifier
ta(i) unique tag alias identifier
rV run-specific PRN generated by the verifier
sG shared group secret among group tags, sG(k)
sV T a secret shared between verifier and tags
sRT a secret shared between reader and tags
x, y, z indices used in zero-knowledge proof
p, w values for zero-knowledge proof
J J = GH ⊕ PRNG(sG ⊕ rV ), where PRNG is a pseudorandom number
generator
η η = PRNG(sV T )⊕ (x||y||z||rV )
seedR seed for the reader PRNG function
rR(h) PRN generated by the reader for a round h
sT (i), sT (i, x) secret key unique to Tag i; sT (i, x) is a 128-bit string with index x in
sT (i)
seedT (i) seed for Tag i PRNG function
rT (i, index) PRN generated by Tag i
cV time constant to limit activity in a protocol run
Table 5.2. Initial values stored in the Reader - PDGPP
group run GH J η sRT
1 1 GH[1] J [1, 1] η[1, 1] sRT [1]
1 2 GH[1] J [1, 2] η[1, 2] sRT [1]
... ... ... ... ... ...
1 u GH[1] J [1, u] η[1, u] sRT [1]
2 1 GH[2] J [2, 1] η[2, 1] sRT [2]
2 2 GH[2] J [2, 2] η[2, 2] sRT [2]
... ... ... ... ... ...
j 1 GH[j] J [j, 1] η[j, 1] sRT [j]
... ... ... ... ... ...
j u GH[j] J [j, u] η[j, u] sRT [j]
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Tags: The verifier initializes each Tag i (that is, the tag with index i in its group) with
the following values - independent of group and run: {TH(i)}; group-specific:
{GH, sG, sT (i), sV T , sRT , p, w, cV , ta(i)}. Tag i starts a run with seedT (i) for its PRNG, initi-
ated by verifier. Tag i does not update any stored values so that tags can stay synchronized.
Tag i has ta(i), which has the following structure. Let values such as GH and sRT be d
bits long (say 128 bits), and let tag index i be c bits long (log of group size). The verifier
chooses a random bit position k in ta(i) where it places index i. It places value k in the low
log d bits of ta(i) and puts random values in the remaining bits of ta(i). Observe that given
ta(i), a reader can extract bit position k then index i.
5.3.2 Grouping-Proof Collection Phase
During the grouping-proof collection phase, the verifier does not connect to the reader
or tags. When in a run, the reader places all tags in a group in open state. This starts the
time window controlled by cV .
Round 1 - Reader
Figure 5.2 shows the reader actions in Round 1. The reader generates a fresh pseudo-
random number rR(1) and XORs this with precomputed values to produce Jr(1), ηr, δ(1).
Here, as in SDGPP (Section 4.3), the randomness introduced with rR(i) keeps messages fresh
across runs and avoids sending values in the clear. The reader sends three values to all tags
in the group - Jr(1), ηr, δ(1).
Round 1 - Tag i
Tag i authenticates the reader, verifies the integrity of the incoming messages, and com-
putes its response using zero-knowledge techniques. Tag i extracts rR(1) then rV (and x, y, z
to use in the zero-knowledge part) then GH. If the extracted GH matches the stored GH,
then Tag i authenticates that the reader is authorized by the verifier and confirms the in-
tegrity of messages received from the reader. If the match fails, then Tag i aborts. Tag
i next computes values that will establish its presence to the verifier. PDGPP uses the
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Reader - Round 1 - parallel
use J , η from current run
rR(1)← PRNG(seedR)
seedR ← rR(1)
Jr(1)← J ⊕ rR(1)
ηr ← η ⊕ rR(1)
δ(1)← sRT ⊕ rR(1)
Send to all tags: Jr(1), ηr, δ(1)
Tag i - Round 1 - parallel
rR(1)← δ(1)⊕ sRT
; Use extracted rR(1) to remove randomness
J ← Jr(1)⊕ rR(1)
η ← ηr ⊕ rR(1)
x||y||z||rV ← PRNG(sV T )⊕ η
; Tag i uses stored value sV T to obtain rV
GH ← J ⊕ PRNG(sG ⊕ rV )
; rV obtained from η is used to extract GH from J
if (extracted GH 6= stored GH)
abort
S(i, 1)← sT (i, x)⊕ PRNG(TH(i)⊕ sT (i, y))⊕ PRNG(sT (i, z)⊕ rV )
K(i, 1)← null
for index ∈ {x, y, z}
rT (i, index)← PRNG(seedT (i))
seedT (i)← rT (i, index)
if S(i, 1)[index] = 0
Z ← (rT (i, index))2 mod p
else ; that is, S(i, 1)[index] = 1
Z ← w · (rT (i, index))2 mod p
K(i, 1)← K(i, 1)||Z
L(i, 1)← GH ⊕ rR(1)⊕ PRNG(J ⊕K(i, 1)⊕ ta(i))
tar(i, 1)← ta(i)⊕ rR(1)
Send to Reader: K(i, 1), L(i, 1), tar(i, 1)
Figure 5.2. Round 1: PDGPP
zero-knowledge property (as in SDZ and SDGPP) described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Using
x, y, z, Tag i selects subsets of the tag’s secret sT (i) along with TH(i) to compute S(i, 1).
Depending on bits of S(i, 1), Tag i concatenates random squares and random pseudosquares
to form K(i, 1). This proves to the verifier that Tag i has the right secret sT (i), without
revealing it to an attacker.
Tag i then computes L(i, 1) and tar(i, 1) to enable the reader to authenticate the tag,
verify the integrity of received messages, and identify index i. Tag i sends K(i, 1), L(i, 1),
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Reader - Round 2 - parallel
K∗ ← 0
initialize all valid(i, 1), valid(i, 2) to 0
for each K(i, 1), L(i, 1), tar(i, 1) message received
ta(i)← tar(i, 1)⊕ rR(1)
GH ← L(i, 1)⊕ rR(1)⊕ PRNG(J ⊕K(i, 1)⊕ ta(i))
if (extracted GH = stored GH)
K∗ ← K∗ ⊕K(i, 1)
extract i from ta(i)
valid(i, 1)← 1
; Tag i’s response is valid
rR(2)← PRNG(seedR)
seedR ← rR(2)
Jr(2)← J ⊕K∗ ⊕ rR(2)
δ(2)← sRT ⊕ rR(2)
Send to all tags: Jr(2),K
∗, δ(2)
Tag i - Round 2 - parallel
; tags in OPEN state so do not need to re-authenticate reader
rR(2)← δ(2)⊕ sRT
; Use extracted rR(2) to remove randomness
J ← Jr(2)⊕K∗ ⊕ rR(2)
; Tag i uses same x, y, z, rV as in Round 1
GH ← J ⊕ PRNG(sG ⊕ rV )
if (extracted GH 6= stored GH)
abort
Q(i, 2)← PRNG(K∗ ⊕ rV ⊕ i)
L(i, 2)← GH ⊕ rR(2)⊕ PRNG(J ⊕Q(i, 2)⊕ ta(i))
tar(i, 2)← ta(i)⊕ rR(2)
Send to Reader: Q(i, 2), L(i, 2), tar(i, 2)
Figure 5.3. Round 2: PDGPP
and tar(i, 1) to the reader.
Round 2 - Reader
The reader receives a response from Tag i and extracts hashed Group IDGH (Figure 5.3).
If the extracted GH matches the stored GH, this authenticates Tag i and also confirms the
integrity of the messages from Tag i - K(i, 1), L(i, 1), and tar(i, 1). Otherwise, the response
is not valid and the reader discards K(i, 1), L(i, 1), and tar(i, 1). The reader flags all valid
responses using valid(i, 1) (initialized to 0 for Round 1). The reader repeats this for all
tags’ responses building K∗ from valid K(i, 1) values. It generates a fresh random number
rR(2) for its Round 2 message to the tags. It builds Jr(2) from J,K
∗, and rR(2) to allow an
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integrity check. The reader sends three values to all tags in the group - Jr(2), K
∗, δ(2).
Round 2 - Tag i
Recall that tags are left from Round 1 in open state, so tags do not need to re-authenticate
the reader. In Round 2, Tag i extracts rR(2) from δ(2), then extracts J , then GH (Figure
5.3). If the extractedGH matches the storedGH, then this confirms the integrity of messages
received from the reader. Using K∗ and rV extracted in Round 1, Tag i will compute its
second message to the verifier: Q(i, 2) = PRNG(K∗ ⊕ rV ⊕ i). This introduces parallel-
dependency into the protocol as K∗ includes computation by all tags. Each Tag i in parallel
uses K∗ in its computation of Q(i, 2).
Then Tag i computes L(i, 2) and tar(i, 2) to enable the reader to authenticate the tag,
verify the integrity of the received messages, and identify index i. Tag i sends Q(i, 2), L(i, 2),
and tar(i, 2) to the reader.
5.3.3 Proof - Verification
The reader compiles information to construct the proof -
P = {RH,GH, run, rR(1), rR(2), (i, valid(i, 2), K(i, 1), Q(i, 2))} including messages from all
tags i with valid responses in Round 1 (Figure 5.4). Note that a tag could have sent a
valid response in Round 1 but not in Round 2 so valid(i, 2) indicates this, while if a tag did
not send a valid response in Round 1, the proof does not include the tag regardless of any
Round 2 response. Then the reader encrypts proof P using the secret key KRV shared with
the verifier to form P ′. The reader sends P ′ to the verifier either immediately or at a later
time with more proofs.
The verifier decrypts P ′ using the shared secret key KRV . Using RH, GH, and run, the
verifier identifies which reader sent the proof, the tag group, and the run of the protocol for
that group. For each Tag i, the verifier computes S(i, 1). Using K(i, 1), p, and w, the verifier
distinguishes between squares and pseudosquares and decodes the xth, yth, and zth bits. If
the decoded bits match in S(i, 1), the verifier confirms that Tag i has participated in the
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Reader - Proof construction - parallel
for each Q(i, 2), L(i, 2), and tar(i, 2) message received
ta(i)← tar(i, 2)⊕ rR(2)
GH ← L(i, 2)⊕ rR(2)⊕ PRNG(J ⊕Q(i, 2)⊕ ta(i))
if (extracted GH = stored GH)
extract i from ta(i)
if valid(i, 1) = 1
valid(i, 2)← 1
; Tag i’s response is valid
Proof construction
Reader puts together proof P = {RH, GH, run, rR(1), rR(2), (i, valid(i, 2), K(i, 1),
Q(i, 2))}, including all tags i for which valid(i, 1) = 1. The reader encrypts P as P ′ using
KRV then sends P
′ to the verifier.
Figure 5.4. Reader - to Verifier: PDGPP
proof. The verifier computes K∗, then along with rV and i, the verifier computes Q(i, 2) and
compares against the received Q(i, 2) to confirm the dependence among tag computations.
5.4 Security Analysis
5.4.1 Security and Privacy Properties
We now compare our protocol to other recent grouping proof protocols in terms of attacks
resisted (Table 5.5.1). We observe that recently proposed protocols are strong on anonymity
and protection from tracking attacks. Both of these properties are very crucial to have a
private system. We now establish that our protocol resists a range of attacks on security and
privacy. For definitions of these attacks, see Section 3.2.4 and [15, 73, 87, 100, 106, 122, 127].
Privacy: The reader and tags never send Tag ID (T to R communication) and group ID (T
to R and R to T) information in the clear but always as part of a value computed with XOR
or PRNG. So an adversary cannot track the same tag from the information exchanged from
one run to the next. Attacks and other considerations relevant to privacy include tracking
attack, anonymity attack, and untraceability. Section 5.4.2 gives a ... through analysis
of untraceability. Impersonation attacks: Impersonation attacks include three variants: (i)
impersonate tag to reader; (ii) impersonate reader to tag; and (iii) impersonate reader to
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verifier. (Attacks under this category include forgery, illegitimate tag, subset replay, and
multi-proof-session attacks.) (i) Without GH and sRT , an adversary cannot construct an
L(i) value that a reader will accept when the reader checks the match between extracted
and stored GH. (ii) Without sRT , sV T , and sG, an adversary cannot construct values that
Tag i will accept when it checks the match between extracted and stored GH. (iii) The
reader sends proof P in encrypted form P ′ using a key shared with the verifier, so without
this key, the adversary cannot send a P ′ that the verifier will decode into valid information.
Furthermore, besides this encryption, an adversary cannot insert into a proof P information
from a missing tag i because the Q values derived from K∗ would not incorporate K(i, 1).
Concurrency attack: This attack is when multiple readers simultaneously try to generate
grouping proofs for the same tags. From the RFID specification [40], once a tag is in open
state to one reader, it does not respond to others. So, after a reader places a tag in open
state at the start of a run, the tag will complete its participation in this grouping proof
before responding to any second reader.
Desynchronization: Because the tags do not update any stored secret, no synchronization
concerns exist.
Replay attack: If an adversary replayed a message from a Tag i to the reader, the
reader would find it not valid because the L(i, 1)(L(i, 2)) does not depend on the current
rR(1)(rR(2)). If an adversary replayed a message from the reader to Tag i from a previous
run, the tag would not detect the replay attack. Tag i would reply with fresh values built
on fresh pseudorandom numbers (see above under privacy), and since it would not update
anything, this would not cause any future harm to our protocol.
Message integrity attack: A tag extracts GH from δ(g), ηr, K
∗, and Jr(g). A reader
extracts GH from K(i, 1) or Q(i, 2), L(i, g), and tar(i, g). In both cases, a match between
extracted and stored GH confirms the integrity of received messages.
Denial of proof: An adversary can attempt to force a proof to fail in various ways, and
the protocol counters each of these. An adversary can block or tamper with messages to
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desynchronize reader and tags, it can block or tamper with messages to break the dependency
chain across tags, and it can impersonate tags. See above for how the protocol prevents each
of these from spoiling a proof.
5.4.2 Untraceability Analysis of PDGPP
In this section, we classify PDGPP in the untraceability model of Avoine et al. [8] and
establish that PDGPP is CLASSIC-Universal-UNT but is not SIDE-Existential-UNT.
Recall from Section 3.3.1 the following. A selects two challenge tags, i and j. Challenger
C relabels the two challenge tags as ĩ and j̃ with respect to a random bit b such that if b = 0,
then ĩ = i and j̃ = j (that is, the labels remain the same), but if b = 1, then ĩ = j and j̃ = i
(that is, C swaps the labels). A must determine the value of b. If the probability that A can
correctly determine b is not very different from 1
2
, then the protocol is untraceable in that
class.
The verifier initializes tags in PDGPP with values:
• independent of group and run, unique for each tag - {TH(i)}
• tag- and group-specific - {ta(i), sT (i), seedT (i)}
• group-specific, which are shared among all tags in a group - {GH, sG, sV T , sRT , p, w}
Tag i does update seedT (i), but does not update other stored values so that tags can stay
synchronized in the protocol. In the untraceability UNT experiment, the adversary A can
interact with the system S within some limitations, which define the adversary classes (see
Section 3.3).
For the class CLASSIC-Universal-UNT and each of the other classes, adversary ACLASSIC
can interact with the tags and reader by eavesdropping, blocking messages, tampering with
messages, spoofing reader or tag, but cannot corrupt any tags.
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For the class SIDE-Existential-UNT, ASIDE cannot corrupt the challenge tags, but can
corrupt any other tags after Challenger C executes the protocol c1 times on Tag ĩ and c2
times on Tag j̃ for some specified numbers (c1, c2).
Theorem 5.4.1 PDGPP is CLASSIC-Universal-UNT.
Proof. For universal untraceability, (c1, c2) can be any values, and proving untraceability
with (c1, c2) = (0, 0) suffices [8]. That is, when ACLASSIC has selected Tags i and j, it has
access to all transcripts for all tags in all previous executions of PDGPP, and it has the
information on which of these transcripts belong to which tags, including i and j. After the
last execution of PDGPP, ACLASSIC receives all transcripts of communications, however, the
Challenger labels the transcripts for i and j in the last execution as belonging to ĩ and j̃
according to a random selection by the Challenger.
Adversary ACLASSIC is not allowed to corrupt any tag. Therefore, the only set of informa-
tion that ACLASSIC can collect for its attack are transcripts (the messages exchanged during
protocol executions), nothing that it can block or tamper with messages and spoof reader
or tags.
To establish that i = j̃, ACLASSIC would have to establish that Tag i in one of the previous
executions is the same as Tag j̃. To do this, ACLASSIC would have to calculate a message
that identifies Tag i (that is, K(i, 1), L(i, 1), Q(i, 2), L(i, 2), tar(i, 1), or tar(i, 2)) from the
information it has obtained from transcripts using information that matches Tag j̃.
From the communication transcripts, ACLASSIC holds that Tag i:
received inputs in round 1 - Jr(1), ηr, δ(1) - and round 2 - Jr(2), K
∗, δ(2) - with all values
specific to this execution, and produced outputs in round 1 - K(i, 1), L(i, 1), tar(i, 1) - and
round 2 - Q(i, 2), L(i, 2), tar(i, 2), while Tag j̃: received inputs in round 1 - Jr(1), ηr, δ(1) -
and round 2 - Jr(2), K
∗, δ(2) (for j̃) - with all values specific to this execution, and
produced outputs in round 1 -K(j̃, 1), L(j̃, 1), tar(j̃, 1) - and round 2 -Q(j̃, 2), L(j̃, 2), tar(j̃, 2).
Even if i = j̃, K(j̃, 1) will be different from K(i, 1), and Q(j̃, 2) will be different from
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Q(i, 2). This is because Tag j̃ generated fresh pseudorandom rT (j̃, index) values to build
K(j̃, 1) and these form K∗ that Tag (j̃) uses for Q(j̃, 2) . Correspondingly,
L(j̃, 1), L(j̃, 2), ta(j̃, 1), ta(j̃, 2) will be different from L(i, 1), L(i, 2), tar(i, 1), tar(i, 2) again
due to different pseudorandom values K(j̃, 1), Q(j̃, 2), rR(1), rR(2) respectively, used in round
1 and 2.
Because ACLASSIC does not have sRT , it cannot extract rR(1) or rR(2). Also, ACLASSIC
cannot calculate rR(2) from rR(1) in the last transcript or any previous transcript be-
cause of how the reader changes seedR. So, ACLASSIC cannot extract x, y, z, and rV
and so cannot calculate S(i, 1) and so cannot calculate K(i, 1). ACLASSIC cannot calculate
L(i, 1), L(i, 2), tar(i, 1), tar(i, 2) without rR(1) and rR(2). Therefore, ACLASSIC cannot match
Tag j̃ with Tag i any better than it can match Tag ĩ.
In PDGPP the reader and tags never send tag secrets and group secrets in the clear but
always as part of a value computed with XOR or PRNG. So ACLASSIC cannot track the same
tag from the messages exchanged from one run to the next.
2
Theorem 5.4.2 PDGPP is not SIDE-Existential-UNT.
Proof. For the Side-Existential-UNT class, adversary ASIDE cannot corrupt the challenge
tags but can corrupt any other tags. It can also obtain transcripts of communications to and
from all tags in all executions of the protocol. To proof that PDGPP is not SIDE-Existential-
UNT, we will prove that challenge tags are traceable for any (c1, c2) so they are traceable for
(c1, c2) = (0, 0) and for any number of execution of PDGPP by the challenger.
This protocol is not SIDE-Existential-UNT because of the static data initialized in all of the
tags in a group. ASIDE can collect GH, sGT , sV T , sRT after any non-challenge tag corruption.
From the communication transcripts, ASIDE holds that Tag i received δ(1) as input in
round 1 (specific to this execution) and produced tar(i, 1) as output in round 1, while Tag j̃
received δ(1) as input in round 1 (specific to this execution) and produced tar(i, 1) as output
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in round 1.
To establish that i = ĩ or i = j̃, ASIDE would have to establish that Tag i in one of the
previous executions is the same as Tag ĩ or j̃ in the last execution. Using sRT from the
corruption of non-challenge tags, ASIDE can calculate for Tag i in the previous execution
rR(1) = δ(1) ⊕ sRT , then ta(i) = tar(i, 1) ⊕ rR(1). For the execution with challenge tags ĩ
and j̃, sRT remains the same, so ASIDE calculates the following: rR(1) = δ(1)⊕ sRT ,
ta(̃i) = tar (̃i, 1)⊕ rR(1), ta(j̃) = tar(j̃, 1)⊕ rR(1). Because i is either ĩ or j̃, then either ta(̃i)
or ta(j̃) will equal ta(i).
2
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5.5 Grouping Proof Protocols Comparison
5.5.1 Comparison of Security and Privacy Properties
Table 5.5.1 compares the security properties of SDGPP and PDGPP to recent grouping
proof protocols. We observe that recently proposed protocols are strong on anonymity and
protection from tracking attacks. Both of these properties are crucial to have a private
system. Also, protocols AbMM’16, Yuan’16, Zhou’18 are vulnerable to some impersonation
attacks because they fail to add an updating mechanism or a time counter mechanism to
ensure the freshness of its communication values for any of the communication sessions.
Table 5.3. Comparison of privacy and security properties of grouping-proof protocols.
Features
Protocol A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11
SDZ’15 [106]







X X X X
BuM’16 [16]
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Yuan’16 [128]























√ √ √ √ √
X
RoBH’18 [93]
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
X
SDGPP [25]
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
PDGPP
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
A1: Privacy/tracking A2: Privacy/anonymity A3: Privacy/untraceability
A4: Impersonation (T - R) A5: Impersonation (R - T) A6: Impersonation (R - V)
A7: Concurrency A8: Desynchronization A9: DoP
A10: Replay A11: Message integrity
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5.5.2 Performance Comparison
Table 5.4 shows clearly that many of the protocols use a type of hash function, MAC, or
elliptical cryptography in tags. These operations require too many gates to be EPC compli-
ant. We also show that SDGPP and PDGPP proposed are more efficient and scalable than
others. We reduced significantly the communication among entities, while still maintaining
and enhancing security and privacy.
Table 5.4. Comparison of communication overhead.
Features
Protocol C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
SDZ’15 [106]
√
PRNG - 8 1 6m 11m
AbMM’16 [1] X Hash 3 1 3 m 7m
BuM’16 [16] X Hash 8 1 3 m+ 2 11m
Yuan’16 [128]
√
PRNG - 8 - 5m+ 2 11m
Hsi’15 [51] X MAC, Hash 4 1 1 m 10m
Zhou’18 [136] X ECC 4 1 3 m 15m
ZhQW’18 [134]
√
PRNG - 4 - m+ 5 6m
ShZW’17 [98] X Hash 4 2 4 2 4m+ 4
RoBH’18 [93]
√
PRNG - 6 - 2m+ 3 3m+ 2
SDGPP [25]
√
PRNG - 9 1 2m 6m
PDGPP
√
PRNG - 9 1 2m+ 2 6m+ 6
C1: EPC Compliance C2: Type of Crypto Function(s) in tags
C3: Number of Crypto Operation(s) in Tag C4: Number of PRNG Operations in Tag
C5: Number of Crypto Operation(s) in Reader C6: Number of PRNG Operations in Reader
C7: Items communicated in a message
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CHAPTER 6
DYNAMIC GROUPING PROOF PROTOCOL
6.1 Introduction
In some applications, a verifier may need to identify the presence of tags in a subgroup of
a larger group. It may create these subgroups dynamically. So a tag can carry information
about the large group, but not about any subgroup to which it will belong. A dynamic
grouping-proof generates proofs of presence of tags in each of these subgroups.
In many large-scale applications, the number of tagged items interrogated may be signif-
icantly high. Due to unreliability of the radio interface, when a group has a large number of
tags, the probability that one or more tags will fail this interrogation is high. An approach to
overcome this problem is to partition the large group into subgroups, each with an adequate
number of tags and each subgroup interrogated separately.
Challenges for creating a dynamic grouping-proof include collision, scalability, limiting
the computational load on the entities involved, and guaranteeing privacy and security. We
designed the Dynamic Grouping Proof Protocol (DGPP) to overcome those challenges.
6.2 Motivation
Many RFID grouping-proofs focus on the static scenario where the tag group is constant
and tag participants remain the same during the grouping-proof. However, many practical
RFID applications, such as logistic control, are dynamic and require partitioning a large
group to subgroups, tag subgroup variations, tags to belong to multiple subgroups, or tags
(the tagged object) to enter and/or leave the reader’s covered area frequently. A fundamental
research question is how to design an efficient and secure protocol in this dynamic setting.
To tackle all those challenges we design the DGPP, implementing solutions to collision,
scalability, limiting the computational load, and guaranteeing privacy and security.
DGPP provides collision resolution by informing tags in a subgroup a specific order in
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which to respond. The approach is adopted to introduce randomness in a tag response across
executions and avoid collisions [51, 63].
DGPP provides scalability by partitioning subgroups within the large group, removing
group- and reader-dependency, limiting the computation and communication load of the tags
(remain compatible under the EPC standard) which allows the protocol to remain light and
suitable for the scope of large-scale applications.
DGPP allows missing tags. If one or more tags are missing or for some reason leave the
reader range while generating a proof (faulty tags, tampered tags, tags removed for genuine
reasons), than the reader collects proof from the available tags. We introduce the desired
significance parameter to allow the reader to treat an incomplete subgroup as satisfactory at
a verifier-defined level. For subgroups that do not satisfy the desired significance, the reader
will run a new grouping-proof iteration, while it will skip already satisfied subgroups in the
new iteration.
DGPP provides privacy and security under precise design requirements for grouping-proof
protocols (see Section 3.2.1).
Because we assume large-scale RFID applications for dynamic grouping-proofs, we choose
DGPP to have a parallel-dependency structure. The reader broadcasts communications to
all tags. All tags that receive the message compute in parallel then communicate back to
the reader one at a time in the specified order.
6.3 Description of DGPP
This section presents the Dynamic Grouping Proof Protocol (DGPP). The reader ex-
ecutes the protocol. The protocol executes up to u iterations for subgroups g[1], ..., g[z].
It builds an array of proofs from each subgroup. Then the reader encrypts this array of
subgroup proofs and sends it to the verifier.
For subgroup g[q] in iteration n, DGPP runs subroutine Subgroup.Check(q, n). An
overview of the subroutine Subgroup.Check(q, n) in the protocol is as follows. The sub-
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routine has two rounds. The first round has two parts. In Part 1, the reader broadcasts a
message to all tags in its range then waits for the tags to finish a computation. In Part 2, the
reader sends a list of transformed tag IDs that selects the tags that will participate in the
grouping proof and specifies the order of the tag responses. The reader receives their replies.
In the second round, the reader uses these replies to build a message that it broadcasts to
all tags (for parallel dependency) and receives their replies that incorporate this message.
We now describe in detail the three phases of the protocol: initialization, grouping-proof
collection, and proof verification. Table 6.1 describes notation used in the protocol.
Table 6.1. Notation for DGPP
Notation Description
G Group of tags
g[q] subgroup (subset) of G generated by the verifier
dq number of tags in a subgroup g[q]
γ[q] designated significance for subgroup g[q]
sV unique secret known only to the verifier
TID(i) unique tag identifier TID(i) = h(tid(i), sV ) (T-part;V-part)
a(i) unique tag alias
〈LPID(j)[q](n)〉 ordering list constructed by the Verifier for subgroup[q] in iteration n; j
- is rank of an element in the list
t[q](n) pseudorandom number such that the sequence of these has distinct in-
crements useful for the entities involved in the protocol
PID(i) pseudo-identity of a tag PID(i)← PRNG(a(i)⊕ t[q](n))
KV R secret key shared between the verifier and reader
sRT secret share by reader and tags in G
tT (i) last authenticated t[q](n) value received by Tag i
seedR a seed for the reader PRNG function initialized from the verifier
rR(k) PRN generated by the reader for round k
cV T time constant to limit tag activity in the protocol
cV R verifier and reader-specific time constant to limit activity in the protocol
6.3.1 Initialization Phase
In the initialization phase, the verifier pre-computes information for u protocol iterations
and stores this information in the reader (see Table 6.2). The verifier also initializes each
tag in group G with specific values.
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Reader: The verifier initializes the reader with the following values (see Table 6.2):
{t[1...z](1...u), 〈LPID(j)[1...z](1...u)〉, seedR[1...z](1...u), γ[1...z], KRV , sRT , cV R}. Variable t
is a long pseudorandom value with distinct increments useful for the entities involved in the
protocol. It gives each tag a way of comparing with an incrementing variable, so no previous
t can be replayed. All tags will follow a specific response sequence (ordering list 〈LPID〉)
within a predefined time interval to send back self-response to the reader. 〈LPID(j)〉 is
a random permutation of tags pseudo-identity in a subgroup, which is constructed by the
verifier and is subgroup- and run-specific. A tag’s pseudo-identity is calculated as: PID(i) =
PRNG(a(i)⊕ t[q](n)). γ[k] is the designated significance parameter (tunable parameter). It
is the count of the number of tags that must be present in order to consider the subgroup
satisfied.






〈PID(i, j)〉 t seed for RNG
g[1] (1) γ[1] 〈LPID(j)[1](1)〉 t[1](1) seedR[1](1)
g[2] (1) γ[2] 〈LPID(j)[2](1)〉 t[2](1) seedR[2](1)
... ... ... ... ... ...
g[z] (1) γ[z] 〈LPID(j)[z](1)〉 t[z](1) seedR[z](1)
g[1] (2) γ[1] 〈LPID(j)[1](2)〉 t[1](2) seedR[1](2)
g[2] (2) γ[2] 〈LPID(j)[2](2)〉 t[2](2) seedR[2](2)
... ... ... ... ... ...
g[z] (2) γ[z] 〈LPID(j)[z](2)〉 t[z](2) seedR[z](2)
... ... ... ... ... ...
g[1] (u) γ[1] 〈LPID(j)[1](u)〉 t[1](u) seedR[1](u)
g[2] (u) γ[2] 〈LPID(j)[2](u)〉 t[2](u) seedR[2](u)
... ... ... ... ... ...
g[z] (u) γ[z] 〈LPID(j)[z](u)〉 t[z](u) seedR[z](u)
Tags: The verifier initializes each Tag i (the tag with index i in G) with the following
values: {TID(i), a(i), tT (i), sRT , cV T}, where TID(i), a(i) are tag-specific, unique for each
tag; tT (i) holds the last value of t[q](n) received, initialized to 0; and sRT is a secret shared
by reader and tags in G.
Note that time interval is limited with cV T for Tag i to complete the protocol.
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6.3.2 Grouping-Proof Collection Phase
The reader will start constructing proofs for all subgroups g[1...z] included in the verifier
scanning request for iteration(1), using fresh random values for each subgroup and iteration.
If any of the subgrouping-proofs in iteration(1) fails to reach γ[k] tags, then the reader will
try again to generate a proof for those subgroups in iteration(2), and so on. During the
grouping-proof collection phase, the verifier does not connect to the reader or tags. When
in an iteration, the reader places all tags in a subgroup in open state. This starts the time
window controlled by cV T .
6.3.2.1 The Protocol
The protocol
PRV ← ∅ ; initialized array of z entries for storing subgroup proofs
stored.count← 0 ; initialized array of z entries to store valid.count for subgroup proofs
Unsat Groups (1)← queue of 1...z
n← 1 ; iteration index
while n ≤ u and Unsat Groups (n) 6= ∅
Unsat Groups (n+ 1)← ∅
while Unsat Groups (n) 6= ∅
q ← Dequeue(Unsat Groups (n))
(valid.count, P [q](n))← Subgroup.Check(q, n)
if valid.count ≥ γ(q)
PRV [q]← P [q](n)
stored.count[q]← valid.count
else
Enqueue (Unsat Groups (n+ 1), q)
if valid.count > stored.count[q]





P ′RV ← E(KRV , PRV ) ; P [q](n) = (q, n, (j, valid(2, j), P ID(i)),M1∗,M2∗, rR(1), rR(2))
includes all information that the verifier needs to rebuild and validate the proof
send to Verifier P ′RV
Figure 6.1. Protocol DGPP
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The reader will start the protocol (see Figure 6.1) by initializing two arrays: PRV to store
subgroup proofs for each subgroup and stored.count to stored valid.count for each stored
subgroup proof. The protocol will keep a queue of unsatisfied subgroups, to indicate the
subgroups that need to be executed in the next iteration.
The flow of the protocol is as follows. In iteration n, the reader starts with a queue
Unsat Groups(n) of unsatisfied subgroups, that is, subgroups for which the reader has not
yet found enough tags in earlier iterations to reach the designated significance. For each
such subgroup g[q], the reader will run Subgroup.Check(q, n) to check for the presence
of tags in g[q]. This returns a count of the tags found and a grouping proof for g[q]. If the
count reaches the designated significance, then the reader stores the proof and count. If not
and the count is more than previous iterations, then the reader stores the proof and count.
Otherwise, the reader discards the returned data. For the counts of g[q] that do not reach
the designated significance, the reader adds q to Unsat Groups(n+ 1).
6.3.2.2 Subroutine Subgroup.Check(q, n)
Figure 6.2 is a view of the messages exchanged among reader and tags in Subgroup.Check(q, n).
This is a high level view of the protocol.
Reader - to subgroup[q](n) Tag i in subgroup[q](n)
round 1
−→ m1R,m2R, 〈LPID(j)[1](1)⊕ rR(1)〉
round 1




←− m2(i),M2(i) to Reader
Figure 6.2. Subgroup.Check(q, n) messages
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Reader - Round 1, Part 1




seedR ← rR(1) ; reader updates seed for round 2
m1R ← sRT ⊕ rR(1) ; to carry rR(1) to tags
m2R ← t[q](n)⊕ rR(1) ; to carry t[q](n) to tags
send to tags m1R,m2R
Tag i - Round 1, Part 1
rR(1)← m1R ⊕ sRT ; extract rR(1), using shared sRT
t[q](n)← m2R ⊕ rR(1) ; use extracted rR(1) to remove randomness
if t[q](n) > tT (i)




Figure 6.3. Round 1, Part 1: subroutine Subgroup.Check(q, n) - DGPP
Round 1, Part 1 - Reader
Figure 6.3 shows the reader actions in Round 1. The reader generates a fresh pseudo-
random number rR(1) using seedR (subgroup- and iteration-specific) and XORs this with
the current counter value and the shared secret sRT . Here the randomness introduced with
rR(1) keeps messages fresh across runs and avoids sending values in the clear. The reader
sends two values to all tags in its range - m1R,m2R. Then the reader will delay its Round
1, Part 2 messages long enough for tags to complete their Round 1, Part 1 computation.
Round 1, Part 1 - Tag i
All tags in the reader range will do as follows (see Figure 6.3): extract rR(1) using shared
sRT , then use extracted rR(1) to remove randomness and get the current value of t[q](n). If
t[q](n) > tT (i), Tag i will compute its pseudo-identity for this run with a PRNG function
using its unique tag alias a(i) XORed with the current t[q](n) and will further randomize this
with rR(1). The additional randomization is necessary to assure privacy and anonymity and
to allow Tag i to send distinct PID(i)r messages if it belongs to multiple subgroups within
an execution of DGPP. Then Tag i will listen to Round 1, Part 2 messages from the reader.
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Reader - Round 1, Part 2
delay
;long enough for tags to complete their Round 1, part 1 computation
〈LPIDr(j)〉 ← 〈LPID(j)[q](n)⊕ rR(1)〉
send to tags 〈LPIDr(j)〉
Tag i - Round 1, Part 2
rank(i)← 0
count(i)← 0
while tag receives LPIDr(j) values from reader
count(i) ++ ; count number of PID messages from reader
if PIDr(i) = LPIDr(j)
rank(i)← count(i)
if rank(i) = 0
abort
; Tag i counts the items in the reader transmission. If an item matches Tag i’s PIDr(i),
then Tag i stores the count as it rank.
; This match establishes that Tag i belongs to the subgroup, authenticates the reader, sets
rank for responding to the reader, and verifies the integrity of t[q](n), rR(1).
tT (i)← t[q](n) ; update tT with the current t[q](n) value
M1(i)← PRNG(TID(i)⊕ t[q](n))⊕ rR(1) ; a tag’s secret designated for the Verifier
m1(i)← PID(i)⊕M1(i)⊕ sRT ; to carry PID(i) and integrity of M1(i) to reader
count(i)← 0 ; reset count
send to reader in slot rank(i): m1(i),M1(i)
Figure 6.4. Round 1, Part 2: subroutine Subgroup.Check(q, n) - DGPP
Round 1, Part 2 - Reader
After the delay, the reader (see Figure 6.4) will use the ordering list, initialized by the
verifier for g[q] in iteration (n). The reader additionally randomizes each PID(i) from the list
with its fresh pseudo-random number rR(1) and sends this to the tags in the list order. The
reader sends dq (number of tags in g[q]) number of messages to transmit the list 〈LPIDr(j)〉.
Round 1, Part 2 - Tag i
While Tag i receives LPIDR(j) messages from the reader, it counts the items received
(see Figure 6.4). If an item matches Tag i’s PIDr(i), the n Tag i stores the count value
as its rank. This match establishes that Tag i belongs to the subgroup, authenticates the
reader, sets its rank for responding to the reader, and verifies the integrity of t[q](n), rR(1).
Tag i will use t[q](n), rR(1) as a part of its computation designated to the verifier. Tag i
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will replace its tT (i) with the authenticated t[q](n) in its tag memory. This value is the only
value that changes in tag’s memory when a tag is interrogated. Value tT (i) prevents replay
attacks and impersonation by a malicious reader.
Tag i next computes values that will establish its presence to the verifier. Tag i will
compute M1(i) with a PRNG function including its unique TID(i) and the current tT (i)
(which is t[q](n)) value and will further randomize this with rR(1). Tag i then computes
m1(i) to enable the reader to authenticate the tag in its slot and verify the integrity of
received messages. Tag i sends in slot rank(i) two messages M1(i),m1(i) to the reader.
Reader - Round 2
M1∗ ← 0
for j = 1 to dq
if m1(i),M1(i) message received in slot j
PID(i)← m1(i)⊕M1(i)⊕ sRT
; Reader computes the PID(i) received in slot j
if (PID(i) computed = LPID(j))
; message integrity of m1(i),M1(i) is verified
; Tag i is authenticated
M1∗ ←M1∗ ⊕M1(i)
valid(1, j)← 1 ; Tag i’s response is valid
rR(2)← PRNG(seedR)
; reader does not update it seed here
; reader has a fresh seed set from the verifier for the next execution of the subroutine
M1∗r ←M1∗ ⊕ rR(1)
m3R ← sRT ⊕ rR(2)
m4R ← t[q](n)⊕M1∗r ⊕ rR(2)
send to tags m3R,m4R,M1
∗
r
Figure 6.5. Round 2: subroutine Subgroup.Check(q, n) - DGPP
Round 2 - Reader
The reader receives responses from tags in slots ordered by 〈LPIDr(j)〉 (see Figure 6.5).
The reader processes information “slot-by-slot”.
The reader computes PID(i) received in slot j, using the received M1(i),m1(i), and
shared secret sRT . If the computed PID(i) matches the stored LPID(j), then the reader has
authenticated the tag and verified the integrity of received messages. Otherwise, the response
is not valid and the reader discards M1(i),m1(i). The reader flags all valid responses using
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valid(1, j) (initialized to 0 in Round 1, Part 1). The reader repeats this for all tags’ responses,
building M1∗ from valid M1(i) values. The reader generates a fresh random number rR(2)
for its Round 2 message to the tags. It builds m3R,m4R, and rR(2) to allow an integrity
check. The reader broadcasts three values to all tags in the group m3R,m4R,M1
∗
r.
Tag i - Round 2
rR(2)← m3R ⊕ sRT
t[q](n)← m4R ⊕ rR(2)⊕M1∗r
if (t[q](n) extracted 6= t[q](n) stored )
abort
; message integrity of rR(2),M1
∗
r is verified if match
M1∗ ←M1∗r ⊕ rR(1) ; tag extracts subgroup dependency message
M2(i)← PRNG(M1∗ ⊕ t[q](n))⊕ rR(2) ; a tag’s secret designated for the Verifier
m2(i)← PID(i)⊕M2(i)⊕ sRT
send to reader in slot rank(i): m2(i),M2(i)
rank(i)← 0 ; reset rank
; after a run, abort, or timeout, Tag i discards all temporary stored variables and any
computational results
Figure 6.6. Round 2: subroutine Subgroup.Check(q, n) - DGPP
Round 2 - Tag i
Recall that tags are left from Round 1 in open state, so tags do not need to re-authenticate
the reader (Figure 6.6). In Round 2, Tag i extracts rR(2) from m3R, then extracts t[q](n)
using the received m3R,M1
∗
r, and extracted rR(2). If the extracted t[q](n) matches the one
stored in Tag i, then this confirms the integrity of messages received from the reader. Tag i
further removes the randomness from M1∗r using rR(1) and obtains the subgroup dependency
message M1∗. Tag i will compute its second message to the verifier. This introduces parallel-
dependency into the protocol as M1∗ includes computation by all tags. Each Tag i uses M1∗
in its computation of M2(i). Tag i then computes m2(i) to enable the reader to authenticate
it in its slot and verify the integrity of received messages. Tag i sends in slot rank(i) two
messages M2(i),m2(i) to the reader. Then Tag i resets its rank(i) to 0.
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Reader - Proof construction in subroutine Subgroup.Check(q, n)
M2∗ ← 0
valid.count← 0
for j = 1 to dq
if m2(i),M2(i) message received in slot j and valid(1, j) = 1
PID(i)← m2(i)⊕M2(i)⊕ sRT
; Reader computes the PID(i) received in slot j
if (PID(i) computed = LPID(j))
; message integrity of m2(i),M2(i) is verified
; Tag i is authenticated
M2∗ ←M2∗ ⊕M2(i)
valid(2, j)← 1 ; Tag i’s response is valid
valid.count+ +
Tag i could have sent a valid response in Round 1 but not in Round 2 so valid(2, j)
indicates this, while if a tag did not send a valid response in Round 1, the proof does not
include the tag regardless of any Round 2 response.
subroutine Subgroup.CHECK [q](n)
P [q](n) = (q, n, (j, valid(2, j), P ID(i)),M1∗,M2∗, rR(1), rR(2)) ; includes slot j for
which valid(1, j) = 1
return (valid.count, P [q](n))
Figure 6.7. Reader: subroutineSubgroup.Check(q, n) [q](n) - DGPP
Proof construction in subroutine Subgroup.Check(q, n)
The reader handles information sent by tags in Round 2 (see Figure 6.7) in similar way
as it does information sent by tags in Round 1. The reader receives responses from tags in
〈LPIDr(j)〉 order. The reader ignores messages in slots without a valid Round 1 message.
The reader computes PID(i) received in slot j using the received M2(i),m2(i), and shared
secret sRT . If the computed PID(i) matches the stored LPID(j), then the reader has au-
thenticated the tag and verified the integrity of received messages. Otherwise, the response
is not valid and the reader discards M2(i),m2(i). The reader flags all valid responses using
valid(2, j). Note that valid(2, j) = 1 indicates that Tag i has sent a valid response in Round 1
and in Round 2. The reader repeats this for all tags’ responses building M2∗ from valid M2(i)
values. Both M1∗,M2∗ constructed will be included in the constructed proof. The reader
construct the proof: P [q](n) = (q, n, (j, valid(2, j), P ID(i)),M1∗,M2∗, rR(1), rR(2)), includ-
ing slots j in which valid tags participated in Round 1. The subroutine Subgroup.Check(q, n)
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returns (valid.count, P [q](n)) to the protocol.
6.3.2.3 Performance remarks
DGPP use only PRNG and XOR operations, which are within the capabilities of EPC
Gen2 tags. In a run of Subgroup.Check(q, n) a tag performs 3 PRNG operations, the
reader performs 2 PRNG operations, and reader and tag communicate a total of 5m + 4
items.
6.4 Security Analysis
6.4.1 Untraceability Analysis of DGPP
In this section, we classify DGPP in the untraceability model of Avoine et al. [8]. We
will establish that DGPP is SIDE-Universal-UNT but not FORWARD-Existential-UNT.
Recall from Section 3.3.1 the following. A selects two challenge tags, i and j. Challenger
C relabels the two challenge tags as ĩ and j̃ with respect to a random bit b such that if b = 0,
then ĩ = i and j̃ = j (that is, the labels remain the same), but if b = 1, then ĩ = j and j̃ = i
(that is, C swaps the labels). A must determine the value of b. If the probability that A can
correctly determine b is not very different from 1
2
, then the protocol is untraceable in that
class.
For the class SIDE-Universal-UNT, ASIDE cannot corrupt the challenge tags, but can cor-
rupt any other tags immediately after C relabels the tags or after any number of executions
of the protocol. That is, (c1, c2) can be any values, including (0, 0).
For the class FORWARD-Existential-UNT, AFORWARD can corrupt the challenge tags and
any other tags after C executes the protocol c1 times on Tag ĩ and c2 times on Tag j̃ for
some specified numbers (c1, c2).
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Theorem 6.4.1 DGPP is SIDE-Universal-UNT.
Proof. For the SIDE-Universal-UNT class, adversary ASIDE cannot corrupt the challenge
tags but can corrupt any other tags. ASIDE can also obtain transcripts of communications to
and from all tags in all executions of the protocol.
For universal untraceability, (c1, c2) can be any values, and proving untraceability with
(c1, c2) = (0, 0) suffices [8]. That is, when ASIDE has selected Tags i and j, it has access to
all transcripts for all tags in all previous executions of DGPP, and it has the information on
which of these transcripts belong to which tags, including i and j. After the last execution
of DGPP, ASIDE can corrupt all non-challenge tags, and ASIDE receives all transcripts of com-
munications, however, the Challenger labels the transcripts for i and j in the last execution
as belonging to ĩ and j̃ according to a random selection by the Challenger.
To establish that i = j̃, ASIDE would have to establish that Tag i in one of the previous exe-
cutions is the same as Tag j̃. To do this, ASIDE would have to calculate m1(i),M1(i),m2(i),
or M2(i) from the information it has obtained from transcripts and from corrupted non-
challenge tags using information that matches Tag j̃. From the communication transcripts,
ASIDE holds that Tag i received inputs m1R,m2R, 〈LPIDr(j)〉,m3R,m4R,M1∗r (specific to
this execution in an iteration n) and produced outputs m1(i),M1(i),m2(i),M2(i), while
Tag j̃ received inputs m1R,m2R, 〈LPIDr(j)〉,m3R,m4R,M1∗r (specific to this execution in
an iteration n′) and produced outputs m1(j̃),M1(j̃),m2(j̃),M2(j̃). For each non-challenge
Tag q, ASIDE can extract all its stored information (that is, TID(q), a(q), tT [q], sRT ). Also,
for Tag q, ASIDE can calculate all values in both rounds of Subgroup.Check.
Suppose ĩ and j̃ are in iteration n′ and i is in iteration n. With sRT extracted from a non-
challenge tag, ASIDE can extract in n′: rR(1), rR(2), and t[q](n′) and in n: rR(1), rR(2), and
t[q](n). These all will be different because of how the reader changes rR(1), rR(2), and t[q](n)
in each run of Subgroup.Check. ASIDE can also extract PID(̃i), P ID(j̃), and PID(i) but
cannot reverse the PRNG computation in PID to reveal any of a(̃i), a(j̃), or a(i). Because
either j̃ = i or ĩ = i, then either a(j̃) = a(i) or a(̃i) = a(i). Without a(̃i), a(j̃), and a(i),
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ASIDE cannot tell which of PID(̃i) or PID(j̃) uses the same a value as PID(i). So ASIDE
cannot match m1(̃i) or m1(j̃) to m1(i).
ASIDE also cannot calculate M1(̃i),M1(j̃), or M1(i). In iteration n′ ASIDE can extract
rR(1) from m1R and in iteration n can extract rR(1) from m1R. Also, ASIDE cannot reverse
the PRNG computation in M1 to reveal any of TID(̃i), T ID(j̃), or TID(i). Because either
j̃ = i or ĩ = i, then either TID(j̃) = TID(i) or TID(̃i) = TID(i). Without TID(̃i), T ID(j̃),
and TID value, ASIDE cannot tell which of M1(̃i) or M1(j̃) uses the same TID(i) as M1(i).
So ASIDE cannot match M1(̃i) or M1(j̃) to M1(i).
ASIDE cannot match m2(̃i) or m2(j̃) to m2(i) because of the same argument as for m1.
In iteration n′, M2(̃i) = M2(j̃), so ASIDE cannot match M2(̃i) or M2(j̃) to M2(i) because
it cannot tell them apart.
Therefore, ASIDE cannot match Tag j̃ with Tag i any better than it can match Tag ĩ.
2
Theorem 6.4.2 DGPP is not FORWARD-Existential-UNT.
Proof. For the FORWARD-Existential-UNT class, adversary AFORWARD can corrupt the
challenge tags and any other tags after a specified number of executions of the protocol by
the Challenger C. It can also obtain transcripts of communications to and from all tags in
all executions of the protocol.
To prove that DGPP is not FORWARD-Existential-UNT, we will prove that challenge
tags are traceable for any pair (c1, c2). The Challenger C executes the DGPP protocol for
multiple executions without interference from AFORWARD. In this proof, we will first use
(c1, c2) = (0, 0), then later we will show that even after Challenger C executes DGPP for any
number of executions, tags will still be traceable. AFORWARD can corrupt any tags. AFORWARD
can also obtain transcripts of communications to and from all tags in all executions of the
protocol.
The key idea is that TID(i) does not change.
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To establish that i = ĩ or i = j̃, AFORWARD would have to establish that Tag i in one of
the previous executions is the same as Tag ĩ or j̃ in the last execution.
After corrupting the challenge Tags ĩ and j̃, AFORWARD can obtain the following secrets, for
ĩ: a(̃i), T ID(̃i), t[q](n′) and for j̃: a(j̃), T ID(j̃), t[q](n′). AFORWARD recomputes the potential
answers of these tags as follows, for ĩ:M1(̃i)← PRNG(TID(̃i)⊕ t[q](n′))⊕ rR(1) and for j̃:
M1(j̃)← PRNG(TID(j̃)⊕ t[q](n′))⊕ rR(1).
Using extracted sRT (via corruption), AFORWARD can extract rR(1) and t[q](n) in iteration
n. Using rR(1) and t[q](n) from iteration n and TID(̃i) and TID(j̃) AFORWARD calculates
PRNG(TID(̃i)⊕ t[q](n))⊕ rR(1) and PRNG(TID(j̃)⊕ t[q](n))⊕ rR(1). One of these will
equal M1(i), identifying which of the Tag ĩ or j̃ is the same as Tag i.
Even if Challenger C then runs DGPP for any number of executions without interference
from AFORWARD, tags will be traceable because TID(i) (and other secrets) does not change.




CARDINALITY ESTIMATION FOR TAG POPULATION
7.1 Introduction
In radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, a fundamental task is tag cardinality
estimation. The reader tries to determined the tag population size speedily and accurately.
Example applications for cardinality estimation include large-scale dense deployment for
intelligent transportation, stadium management, conference, and warehouse systems with
thousands or even millions of objects. A wide variety of tag estimation algorithms has been
proposed in the literature [4, 47, 48, 60, 68, 72, 89, 131, 133].
We first formally discuss the problem (Section 7.2). Then we elaborate on the working
environment and the idea of “estimators” (Section 7.3). We also introduce an algorithm
template for a methodology for cardinality estimation and adopt this template for our ap-
proach (Section 7.6). In Section 7.4 we introduce new methods to obtain an initial “Phase 1”
estimate of the cardinality. In Section 7.5 we present an analysis of the (fe − f0) estimator
on the {0, 1, e} channel. This result is an extension of the GERT approach of Hasan et al.
[48] for the {0, e} channel. The result shows that both approaches, ours and GERT, exceed
the requirements of the problem (at potentially added cost). We propose an approach to
use simulation data (Section 7.6) to design an algorithm that better balances the cost and
accuracy constraints of the problem.
7.2 Problem Statement
Suppose there are T tags in the vicinity of the reader. The aim of cardinality estimation
of the tag population, henceforth called cardinality estimation, is to determine an estimate of
the numbers of tags in the vicinity of the reader while meeting desired accuracy requirements.
Formally, for any real error probability 0 < α < 1 and real relative error 0 < β < 1, the









where Test is the estimated value of the tag population size, T is the actual value of tag
population size , and Pr(·) is the probability of an event.
For example, if the exact number of tags is T =1000, the specified relative error β = 3%
and target error probability α = 95% then the output estimate Test of an (α, β) accuracy
requirement should be between 970 and 1030 at least 95% of the time.
7.3 Problem Environment
Consider a set of tags that are assumed to be anonymous (no IDs transmitted) and that
possess minimal computational ability. In this work we require a tag, given an integer f ≥ 1,
to only be able to generate a random bit with probability 1
f
of being a 1 and probability
(1− 1
f
) of being a 0. The tags communicate with the reader through a channel of resolution k
(see Section 2.1.2). We will primarily consider k ≤ 2 ({0, e} and {0, 1, e} channels, although
some of the proposed ideas extend to large values of k).
The tags operate in a slotted (synchronous) environment in which a typical sequence of
actions performed by tags includes (a) reading an integer f ≥ 1 from the channel and (b)
for each of the next f slots writing to the channel with probability 1
f
. This sequence of f
slots is called a frame of size f . The remaining portions of the algorithms are executed on
the, relatively more powerful, reader.
As a result of T tags writing independently on f slots of a frame, the channel returns a
sequence of f output symbols to the reader. Formally, let {ti : 1 ≤ i ≤ T} be the set of
tags. Let tag ti write symbol si,j on a slot, j (1 ≤ j ≤ f) where si,j ∈ {0, 1}. Let the output
symbol on slot j be ŝj ∈ {0, 1, ...., k − 1, e}. Assume the input symbols to be numerical
values {0, 1} and output symbols {0, 1, ...., k − 1, e} (e ≥ 2) to also be numerical values, we


















where 1a(v) = 1 iff b = a. That is, f0 is the number of
′0′ output symbols in the f -slot
frame, f1 is the number of
′1′ output symbols in the f -slot frame and so on.
An estimator is a function of the output symbol ŝj (where 1 ≤ j ≤ f) that is used
to estimate the tag population. Typically estimators use fŝ in various ways for example,
f0, f1, fe, fe − f0 introduced earlier. Estimators include the average of 0 (EZB [60]), or the
average of collisions e (UPE [59]), the average run length of non-zero slots (ART [131]), the
length of continuous non-zero slots (LoF [89]), and the indices of the first non-zero slot for
multiple rounds (FNEB [47]).
Figure 7.1 presents a template for an algorithm for cardinality estimation. For a set of T
tags, let Phase 1 and Phase 2 require τ1 and τ2 time (slots). Observe that if the number of
bits needed to represent the quantities f, n are constants relative to the tag size T , then the
number of slots needed for Phase 2 (including any slots used to synchronization or separate
iterations) is a1 + a2n+nf , where a1 and a2 are constants. In this work we will assume that
a1 = a2 = 0 since n and the constant overheads are generally small compared to f . Thus,
the time for Phase 2 is assumed to be nf .
The above algorithm template can be further generalized to accommodate a different
frame size at each iteration and a persistence probability to further temper the probability
of a tag writing in a slot (with persistence probability p̃, tags write a ′1′ with probability p̃
f
;
we have assumed p̃ = 1). Using persistence probability is like using a frame size of f
p̃
with
dnp̃e iterations. The algorithmic template could also be extended to allow any method of
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Algorithm Cardinality Estimation
Phase 1: Get an initial estimate T0.
Phase 2:
The reader uses T0 to determine a frame size f and the number of iterations n.
The reader broadcasts f, n to all tags.
for each slot j (where 1 ≤ j ≤ f) do
Each tag independently writes symbol ’1’ (respectively, ’0’) to the channel with
probability 1f (respectively, 1−
1
f ).




The reader computes the average estimator value E = 1n
n∑
i=1
Ej over all n iterations. Then
uses an inverse operation on E to determine the final estimate Test
Figure 7.1. Algorithm Cardinality Estimation
using (ŝj) to determine E. These extensions accommodate most approaches in the literature.
For Phase 1 we will use the well known algorithm of Willard [119] for leader election on a
{0, 1, e} channel (henceforth called Willard). We modify this algorithm to produce an
estimate T0 of the tag population. Our modification runs in O(log log Tmax) time, where
Tmax is the maximum number of tags that the system can expect. (In our simulation we
have assume Tmax = 2
16−1.) Further details of the Willard algorithm appear in Section 7.4.
We also extend Willard algorithm to provide more accurate outputs. These extensions
are called Willard+, Willard∗, Willard+∗. Section 7.4.2 describes these extensions.
We now briefly explain the approach used in Phase 2 to count the channel output symbols
to obtain estimate Test . Consider, for example that the estimator used is the number of zeroes




Consider any estimator E, for example consider f0 estimator on Figure 7.2. Suppose
f0 was 0.7. Then it correspond to a
T
f
value of 0.5. That is with an f0 = 0.7 value one
could expect that T
f


















Figure 7.2. General nature of the quantities {f0, f1, fe}
illustration suppose the observed value f0 = 0.7 can vary between 0.6 and 0.8. Then the







≤ 20%. On the other hand suppose f0 = 0.2 with T = 1.7 and
could vary between 0.3 and 0.1. Then T
f
can vary approximately between 1.1 and 2.3. Here




≤ 35.3%. This is a higher slope of the average value of the
estimator. Suppose that for the f0 = 0.7 case the values the
T
f
could vary between 1 and




≤ 200%. Therefore, the
variance of the estimators is also important. In addition, to high slope and low variance the
average value of the estimators should be monotonic to facilitate inversion.
Observe that this plot decreases monotonically. Therefore the function ψ(T
f
) = f0 that
gives the average value of f0 for each value of
T
f
, has an inverse ψ−1(f0) =
T
f
. For a given
value of f0 and with the known value f, T can now be estimated. The n iterations serve
to reduce the variance in the observed value f0. Not all estimators are equally effective
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(particularly in certain range of values of T
f
[59]) and some are not monotonic (for example
f1, see Figure 7.2). In our work we will use the estimator fe − f0, which showed promise in
initial investigations (see Section 7.3.1).
Table 7.1 summarizes the main notation used across this chapter.
Table 7.1. Notation Cardinality Estimation.
f frame size
f0 number of slots in a frame with no write
f1 number of slots in a frame with one write
fe number of slots in a frame with more than one write
Test an estimate of a tag population
T0 tag population size estimate in Phase 1
T the actual tag population
p̃ persistence probability
T p̃
f or Tp system load ratio
E an estimator
7.3.1 Empirical Study of the Behavior of Estimators
The quantities {f0, f1, fe} are critical to this work. Figure 7.2, and after shows the
general nature of these quantities. In our algorithm in Figure 7.1, and after 7.1 the reader
uses a function from its reading f0, f1, fe to determine an estimate of T . Several standard
estimations appear in the literature that include f0, f1, fe.
















































, as potential estimators to be used.
For each estimator we plotted its average value and variance across a large number of
trials and tag populations (see Figures 7.3 and 7.4). Notice that all estimators have a small
slope and low variance for large values of T
f





































































Figure 7.4. Variance for potential estimators
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some level of accuracy. For small values of T
f
the fe − f0 estimator has the large sloop with
a somewhat larger variance. Estimators investigating f1 are non-monotonic and were not
consider functions.
7.4 Phase 1 Algorithms
The algorithms for Phase 1 that we use in this work are all based on the work of Willard
[119]. We will discuss the adaptation of Willard’s algorithm to this work. Then we will
discuss extensions for higher accuracy. We will also illustrate the performance of these
algorithms.
7.4.1 The Algorithm Willard
The leader election of Willard [119] searches for a leader from a set of T entities (tags in
our case). It proceeds in two stages. The first stage determines (for the most part) a method
to estimate the value of T and that is what we use for this work. Consequently we do not
describe Stage 2 of Willard’s algorithm. What we describe below is the adaptation used for
this work. We will call the adaptation Willard.
The algorithm Willard proceeds as follows. First, observe that if T tags write to the
channel with probability 1
T0
, then the average numbers of writes is T
T0
.
Suppose 1 ≤ T ≤ 2m, that is, T is an m-bit number. The algorithm first checks estimate
T0 = 2
m
2 as a potential value of T . Every tag writes to the channel with probability 1
T0
and the reader checks the channel output. If the channel output is ′0′ then nominally the
probability 1
T0
is too small and the estimate T0 is too large. If the channel output is e, then
nominally the estimate T0 is too small. If the channel output is
′1′, then (on average) the
estimate is about right. If the estimate is too small (resp., large), then it is increased (resp.,
decreased) in a binary search manner.
As an example, if T = 1000, m = 16, then the first guess T0 = 2
8 nominally produces an
e. So the next T0 is to be 2
(16+8)
2 = 212 = 2048. This time the channel nominally returns a 0
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and so T0 will reduce to 2
(12+8)
2 = 210 = 1024. The channel output could now be ′1′.
In general, Willard terminates either when the symbol ′1′ is output by the channel
or when the binary search has narrowed things down to a single bit position b (where 0 ≤
b < m). In the latter case the last symbol read could be a ′0′,′1′, or e. Suppose Willard
terminates with symbol ′s′ and bit position b. Then the returned estimate T0 is as follows:
T0 =





if s = ’0’;
2b+2b+1
2
if s = e;
When s = ′1′ then the algorithm assumes that T0 is close to T . When the algorithm
returns a ′0′ then the probability 1
2b
was nominally too low to elicit any writes from the tags.
In other words, 2b is too high an estimate. Since the binary search nominally indicated that
2b−1 < T < 2b it selects T0 to be somewhere in the middle of the range. The ceiling is to
account for b = 0. The case s = e is similar.
This approach, on an average, can be shown to produce a value roughly within a factor of
2 of the correct value. However, this is not good enough as β (error requirement) is typically
much higher and a second phase is needed. It is clear that if Tmax = 2
m, then the algorithm
runs in O(logm) = O(log log Tmax) time. Figures 7.7 and 7.9 show the performance of
Willard over a range of values of T . The plot is based on 100,000 runs of Willard for
some values of T in the range from 2 to 10,000.
We now modify Willard along two directions that improve its accuracy at the cost of
more time.
7.4.2 Extensions of Willard
Observe that when 2b < T < 2b+1 then even when Willard operates as expected on an
average, the value of T can be anywhere in a range (2b, 2b+1)of size approximately 2b. As b
increases, this range also increases. Algorithm Willard+ addresses this issue.
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Suppose Willard terminates with symbol ′0′ at bit b. Then nominally 2b−1 ≤ T < 2b
or 0 ≤ T − 2b−1 < 2b−1. One could run Willard again on range [0, 2b−1) assuming an
offset of 2b−1. If Willard now produced a ′1′ symbol with bit 0 ≤ b1 ≤ b − 1 then we
could now assume that the estimate is close to 2b1 + 2b−1. This process proceeds recursively
until the estimate is down to a resolution value of 1. As an example, consider T = 28. Let
Willard run close to the expected behavior average case. Then the first time of Willard
(called by Willard+) may terminate with symbol ′0′ at bit position 5. This indicates that
24 < T < 25 or 0 < T − 24 < 24. The second recursive call to Willard will now be on
range [0, 24) but with an “offset” 24. This could return a bit position of 3 again with symbol
′e′ indicating that 23 ≤ T − 24 ≤ 24 or 0 < T − 23 − 24 < 23. We now called Willard with
range [0, 23) and an offset of 23 + 24. This third call may produce a ′1′ on bit position 1, so
the final estimate would be 21 + 23 + 24 = 25. Figure 7.5 illustrate the general behavior of
Willard+.
Value returned by Last channel Nominal starting range for
Willard symbol range Willard+
0 [2i−1, 2i] 2i−1 + [0, 2i−1]
i 1 [2i, 2i] 2i + [0, 0]
e [2i, 2i+1] 2i + [0, 2i]
Figure 7.5. Willard+ ranges of an estimate
The worst case behavior of Willard+ happens when T is very large. The first call to
Willard on range [0, 2m) causes a next call on range [0, 2m−1), and the third on [0, 2m−2)
and so on. We know that a call to Willard on range [0, 2m) runs in O(logm) time. So the






= O (m2). Since 2m represents an upper bound on T , the





Algorithm Willard+ repeatedly calls Willard to obtain a more resolved value for
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T0. However, it does not address a fundamental issue of inaccuracy with Willard. A bad
decision made early on cannot be compensated for by additional coin tosses. For example,
let T = 28 and let Tmax = 2
16. At the very first iteration all 28 tags write to the channel




. Nominally we should expect a ′0′ from the channel. If a ′1′ is
produced then T0 is estimated to be 256. If it produces an e, the algorithm will not let T0 be













Figure 7.6. Extensions of Willard
Figure 7.6 shows all discussed extensions of Willard in Phase 1.
Algorithm Willard∗ addresses this by repeating this early coin flip several times and
selecting a “majority” value. Typically when p = 2−x and 2x is far from T , symbols ′0′ and e
are much more probable. Repeating the test several times reinforces the probable outcome.








When p = 2−x and 2x is close to T , then the probability of obtaining ′0′, ′1′ or e are
all quite close to each other. This is because for large T and p ∼= 1T , probability of
′1′ is
Tp(1 − p)(T−1) ∼= (1 − 1T )
T ∼= e−1. Also the probability of ′0′ is (1 − p)T ∼= e−1 ∼= 0.368, so
the probability of getting an e is 1 − 2
e
∼= 0.264 (see Figure 7.2) around the 0.3 estimator
value). In this case where the numbers of times ′0′, ′1′ or e occur are not that different, we
will assume the outcome to be ′1′.
There is no fixed method to repeat the test at each slot. However, recognizing that
large values of x (where p = 2−x) have large consequences for errors and that indiscriminate
repetition can increase the running time for the algorithm, we select to repeat a trial p = 2−x,
x times. Clearly this is not the only way to implement Willard∗.
Figures 7.7 - 7.9 show results of running Willard, Willard+, and Willard∗ for















Figure 7.7. Average error Willard, Willard+, Willard∗
Willard+∗ has not yet been implemented, but we expect better results from it that







































Figure 7.9. Error varinace Willard, Willard+, Willard∗
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error variance of the three methods implemented in Phase 1. The values in Figures 7.7–7.9
























It can be seen that Willard∗ runs O(log Tmax log log Tmax) time.
Another approach is to repeat the test proportional to the range of bit positions in the
current iteration. This will make the time O(log2 log Tmax).
Willard+ calls Willard multiple times, or Willard∗. So one could also design a
Willard+∗ algorithm that calls Willard∗ in the same way as Willard+ calls Willard.
7.5 Analytical Results for the fe − f0 on the {0, 1, e} Channel
Hasan et al. [48] introduced an estimator for the {0, e} (often called a {0, 1}) channel.
This estimator is fe − f0 (or f1 − f0 in the {0, 1} setting). We followed the same analytical
approach to extend the work to a {0, 1, e} channel. We too use the fe−f0 estimator; however,
it has different meaning compared to that in the {0, e} channel. As a result, several of our
parameters and intermediate quantities were also different, some more involved.
Notable differences in the extension are in the derivation of a key parameter κ needed to
ensure a Gaussian distribution of the estimator values. As before T is the tag population
and Test (output of the tag estimation) is an estimate of T . For a given frame size f we











Let Xij represents the random variable that tag i writes on slot j; every tag writes on a
slot with probability p = p̃
f
(where p̃ is the persistence probability, we assume p̃ = 1 (see




 1, with probability p0, with probability 1− p





The probability distribution for Yj’s is as follows:
Yj =

0, with probability p0 = (1− p)T
1, with probability p1 = Tp(1− p)(T−1)
e, with probability pe = 1− (p0 + p1)
(7.5)
Here p0 is the probability that a slot has no writes, p1 is the probability that a slot has
exactly one write, and pe is the probability that a slot has more than one write. To help



























































The probability mass function for Cj(e−0) is as follows:
Cj(e−0) =

−1, with probability p0 = (1− p)T
0, with probability p1 = Tp(1− p)(T−1)
1, with probability pe = 1− (p0 + p1)
Recall that Xij is Bernoulli random variable (indicating the write in a slot by a tag),
and Yj is the sum of Xij (number of writes). Using Equation (7.6) we determine the mean
(expected value) and variance of Cj(e−0) and C(e−0) as follows:
µj(e−0) = Exp[Cj(e−0)] = −1p0 + 0p1 + 1pe = pe − p0 = 1− 2p0 − p1 (7.8)
From Equation (7.8)


























(−1)2p0 + 02p1 + 12pe
)
− (pe − p0)2 =
(









pe + p0 − (pe − p0)2
)
(7.11)




)T ≈ e−`, p1 = Tp(1− p)(T−1) ≈ `e−`, and pe = 1− (p0 + p1) ≈ 1− (e−` + `e−`). The
expression in the below extension of Equation (7.5) can be written as
Pr(Yj = Y ) ∼=

e−`, if Y = 0
`e−`, if Y = 1
1− (e−` + `e−`), if Y = 2
7.5.1 Gaussian Approximation of the fe − f0 Estimator
Recall that the problem requires (see Section 7.2) the following.
Pr
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Recall that fe (resp. f0) is the number of occurrences of e (resp. 0) in the frame. To
perform cardinality estimation of the tag population size while maintaining the accuracy
requirements given above we need a well approximated probability distribution function for
C(e−0). Recall from Figure 7.3, that C(e−0) or fe − f0 is a monotonically increasing function
of T (or T
f
) and is, therefore, invertible. However, given a value of C(e−0) there could be
an error if C(e−0) is just inverted to get a value of T . This is because C(e−0) is a random
variable taking a range of values. Here, as in GERT [48], we determine the conditions for




The Lindeberg Feller Theorem with the special case of triangular array CLT [14] (also
used by Hasan et al. [48]) gives a set of conditions for Cj(e−0) to be Gaussian (or normal).
Theorem 7.5.1 (Lindeberg Feller [14]) Let {Xj} be an array of independent random
variables with Exp[Xj] = 0 and Exp[X
2
j ] = σ
2








then Z is a normal distribution with zero mean and B2 variance if the condition below holds








{X2j : |Xj| > εB}
]
−→ 0 (7.12)
We know that Exp[Cj,(e−0)] = µ(e−0). The Lindeberg Feller theorem requires the variable
to have zero mean. To satisfy this requirement, we define C̃j(e−0) = Cj(e−0) − µ(e−0). So
Exp[C̃j(e−0)] = 0 and the variance σ
2
j(e−0) is the same for Cj(e−0) and C̃j(e−0).






−1− µ(e−0), with probability p0
−µ(e−0), with probability p1
















According to the Lindeberg Feller Theorem, Z will be asymptotically normal with mean








∣∣∣C̃j(e−0)∣∣∣ > ε√fσj(e−0)}] −→ 0 (7.14)
In the condition of membership in the set
{
C̃j(e−0) :
∣∣∣C̃j(e−0)∣∣∣ > ε√fσj(e−0)} from Equa-
tion (??), we consider three cases when C̃j(e−0) is not counted in the expected value.These
following conditions correspond to the three possibilities of Equation (7.13). For brevity we




| − 1− µ| ≤ λ
| − µ| ≤ λ
|1− µ| ≤ λ
(7.15)
So we required λ ≥ max {| − 1− µ|, | − µ|, |1− µ|} We now consider two possibilities.
• [Case −1 ≤ µ ≤ 0]: Here | − 1 − µ| = 1 − µ. The first condition of Equation (7.17)
becomes −1 − µ ≤ λ, for the second condition of Equation (7.17) we have | − µ| =
−µ ≤ λ. The third condition becomes |1 − µ| = 1 − µ ≤ λ. In summary λ ≥
max{1 + µ, 1− µ} = 1− µ. So here require λ ≥ 1− µ.
• [Case 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1]: Here | − 1 − µ| = 1 + µ, | − µ| = µ, and |1 − µ| = 1 − µ. Clearly
λ ≥ max{1 + µ, µ, 1− µ} = 1 + µ.
Thus C̃j(e−0) will not contribute to the expected value in Equation (7.14) when λ ≥ 1+ |−µ|.
When this happens the simulation in Equation (7.14) becomes equal to 0.
Let









κσ ≤ λ. The condition that λ ≥ 1 − |µ| can be satisfied if
√
κσ ≥ 1 − |µ| or
κσ2 ≥ (1 − |µ|)2. We now consider the two cases for −1 ≤ µ ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. Let the
κ values for this two cases be κ1 and κ2. So if κ1 ≥ (1−µ)
2
σ2
and κ2 ≥ (1+µ)
2
σ2
, and κ ≥ κ1, κ2
then our conditions for Equation (7.13) tending to 0 be satisfied.
Observe that σ2 = σ2j(e−0) = pe+p0−(pe−p0)2 = 1−(p0+p1)+p0−(1−(p0−p1)−p0)2. Substi-
tuting p0 ∼= e−`, p1 ∼= `e−`, and pe ∼= 1− (e−` + `e−`), we have σ2 ∼= e−`(4 + `− e−`(2 + `)2).
Next, 1− µ = 1− (pe − p0) = 2p0 + p1 ∼= e−`(2 + `). So (1− µ)2 ∼= e2−`(2 + `)2 and for the






4 + `− e−`(2 + `)2
(7.17)
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(2− e−`(2 + `))2
e−`(4 + `− e−`(2 + `)2)
(7.18)
With ` = Tp, it can be verified for ` ≥ 1.1462, κ2 ≥ κ1. Thus, we need
κ , max{κ1(`), κ2(`)} ≥

e−`(2 + `)2
4 + `− e−`(2 + `)2
, if ` ≤ 1.1462
(2− e−`(2 + `))2
e−`(4 + `− e−`(2 + `)2)

























Figure 7.10. Accuracy achieved for targeted accuracy α = 0.95, and β = 0.05
The quality of the estimation depends on ε. While C(e−0) −→ N(µ(e−0), σ2e−0), where
N(µ, σ2) represents a normal distribution with mean µ, and variance σ2 and the frame size
is large enough to satisfy Equation (7.16) and its extensions below. Let l and u be the allow
lower and upper bound values of
Cj(e−)) − µ(e−0)
σe−0

















































−Pr[l ≤ θ ≤ u] ≤ ε (7.20)
Proceeding as in Hasan et al. [48] it can be shown that the maximum value of ε is 1−α,
with κ = ε2 max f = (1− α)2f . Or f = κ
(1−α2) given by Equation (7.19). We simulated the
performance of our approach and that of a similar analysis for GERT. Figure 7.10 and 7.11
show the results for this simulation. The improvement over the {0, e} channel is expected as
the channel itself has a higher resolution. Notice from the plot that both approaches exceed
the α requirements of the given problem.This also implies that both approaches have also
expended a higher cost for a better than needed result. In the next section, we will use an
experimental approach to close this gap.
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7.6 Phase 2 - Cardinality Estimation
Several approaches have been proposed for cardinality estimation [48, 60, 72, 89, 131, 133]
particularly those found in Phase 2 (see Algorithm in Figure 7.1). Many of these approaches
used analytical results, for example, to approximate the distribution of estimator values.
This approximation reduces the efficiency of the approach. In this section we outline a broad
methodology to design an algorithm based on experimental observation. This methodology
has two parts that correspond to the two phases in Figure 7.1. The goal here is to design
Phase 2, in particular the determination of the frame size f and number of iteration n, given
the initial estimate T0. However, the distribution of T0 obtained from Phase 1 is critical for
the study.
Let A be any Phase 1 algorithm; A could be Willard, Willard+, Willard∗,
Willard+∗ or any other algorithm (for example Nakano et al. [81]). The first task is
to run A on different values of T (actual tag population sizes) to record the estimate gener-
ated by A. To obtain statistically significant results, we need to run each value of T multiple
times, say X times. Suppose for integer 1 ≤ i ≤ X, algorithm A with input T produces an
estimate T0 when run for the i
th time. We will say that T0 = A(T, i).
Let = = {T : Tmin ≤ T ≤ Tmax} be the set of tag population sizes on which A is run.
For any value of T0 within the accepted range, let U = (T0) be a multiset of all values of
T that produce estimate T0. That is, U(T0) = {T : ∃i A(T, i) = T0}. This multiset U(T0)
gives the distribution of T values that appears to the Phase 2 of the cardinality estimation
algorithm as T0. We now explain how this U(T0) can be used to determine f and n.
For a given estimator E, assurance probability α and relative error β, let B denote an
algorithm for Phase 2 (see Figure 7.1).
Observe that when an actual cardinality estimation algorithm is run, it can observe the
value of T0, but the algorithm runs with T tags. Our simulation likewise uses T0 as a
parameter, but T only to simulate the actions of the tags. The value of T itself is not used
in any other way. For a given Phase 1 estimate T0, that is based on the value of T (actual
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number of tags), desired accuracy bounds α, β, frame size f , number of iterations n, and
estimator E, let B(T0, T, A, n, f) = Test be the final estimate. We now proceed as follows to
determined an “optimal” f and n, given the observable T0.
Initially let f(0) = T0 and let n = 1. We run B(T0, T, A, 1, f(0)) for each T ∈ U(T0).
Recall that U(T0) is a multiset, so the same value of T may be simulated multiple times.
Let C = {B(T0, T, 1, f(0)) : T ∈ U(T0)}; this is also a multiset. Observed that the error
due to B(T0, T, A, 1, f(0)) = Test is
|Test − T |
T
which we denote by Err(T0, T, 1, f). Let




If α0 > α, then we are doing more than needed and f(0) can be reduced. On the other




and repeat the process in binary search type manner until in some y iteration αy = α and
f(y) is the desired value of f . In some cases, particularly for stringent α, β requirements, it
may not be possible to get a suitable f . If f(y) exceeds an upper limit fmax, then we repeat
the process with n = 2. The simulation can also determine the cost of each choice of f .
We have conducted extensive simulations with the following possible values for the accuracy
assurance parameters.
• Algorithm A could be Willard and Willard∗
• Estimator E is assumed to be fe − f0.
• (α, β) can be (85%, 10%) and (95%, 5%).
• Tmin = 1,Tmax = 10, 000
• X, the maximum number of trials for each value of Tmin ≤ T ≤ T max is 100,000.
This large number was used so that each of the buckets U(T0) has a sufficiently large
number of cases.
In the process we have extended a well known algorithm Willard, Willard+, Willard∗,
and Willard+∗ that provide greater accuracy at added cost. Our work on Cardinality
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estimation currently focuses on the fe − f0 estimator (based on initial evidence that this
estimator may outperform others). Figure 7.12 shows the cost for α = 95%, β = 5% case
for GERT [48] and our adaptation of GERT for the {0, 1, e} channel. This cost is higher
than the experimental approach that we outlined in this section. Observed that even though
Willard∗ is more inexpensive then Willard (see Figure 7.12) this cost is well worth its







































Figure 7.12. Cost achieved by GERT,fe−f0 (analytical approach), and experimental fe−f0
for α = 0.95, and β = 0.05
The Phase 1 algorithm gets a crude estimate that guides the Phase 2 algorithm. We
realized that we can use an algorithm from our own template with limited, but low-cost
performance for Phase 1, which may provide more accurate algorithms. We believe that the
experimental methodology lays the foundation for additional work on cardinality estimation,
including the effect of Phase 1 algorithms, new estimators, and hybrid methods for different
ranges of T .
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
The objective of this dissertation is a study of distributed RFID-based algorithms for
Grouping Proof and Cardinality Estimation. We have made several key contributions to the
fields of RFID protocols.
For Grouping Proof Protocols, security and efficiency are important goals in an RFID
settings. An emphasis of this research was the balance among security, privacy, and use-
fulness. In the truly practical, user-driven development of RFID applications, we designed
three grouping-proof protocols to minimize loss of security, and privacy. In each framework
we strove to achieve efficiency tailored to the degree of security required in an RFID system.
One avenue for further study would be to research and design protocols specific to the
scope of particular applications. Furthermore, quantifying the type of security specific to
the scope of particular applications, we will aim to design grouping-proof protocols that
achieve efficiency tailored to the degree of security required in an RFID application. An-
other direction would be the practical implementation of our three grouping-proof protocols,
looking more into the details of the time and quality of random number generator used in
our protocols, the time cost (within EPC standard) on passive tags, and the circuit cost.
For Cardinality Estimation we developed a framework for using simulated data to gener-
ate an “optimal” estimation algorithm in which we balance the cost and accuracy constraints
of the problem. The findings suggest that such a method shows considerable improvement
over other proposed analytical approaches that seek to model the problem (albeit inaccu-
rately) and that often exceed the requirements of the problem (at potentially added cost).
In the process we have extended a well known algorithm Willard, for simple cardinal-
ity estimation Willard+, Willard∗, and Willard+∗ algorithms that provide greater
accuracy at added cost. Our work on cardinality estimation currently focuses on the fe− f0
estimator (based on initial evidence that this estimator may outperform others). It would
be interesting to extend this approach to other estimators (for example, other linear combi-
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nations of f0, fe).
The Phase 1 algorithm gets a crude estimate that guides the Phase 2 algorithm. Would
it be beneficial to use an algorithm from our own template with limited, but low-cost perfor-
mance for phase 1. This may indicate a pipeline of progressively more accurate algorithms.
How would the cost of the algorithm be affected if f was constrained to be 2x (a power
of 2)? This will considerably reduce the hardware complexity of the tag (specifically, its
random number generator).
Can our cardinality estimation algorithm itself be used to simulate a higher resolution
{0, 1, ..., k − 1, e} channel, where tag population up to k − 1 can be estimated accurately?
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